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Abstract 
 The medial temporal lobes (MTLs), and in particular the hippocampus, have been the focus of a 
large body of research since the discovery of a memory deficit in patient H.M. following surgical removal 
of those brain regions.  This research has pointed to the role of the hippocampus in supporting a particular 
kind of memory, namely relational memory, and has attempted to explain how the hippocampus allows 
one to retrieve information given some cue (such as on a recognition memory test).  However, persistent 
evidence has also appeared throughout the literature suggesting that the hippocampus is important for 
novelty processing.  Several experiments presented here explore what novelty processing may be exactly, 
how it relates to typically-discussed memory processing, and how hippocampal function impacts these 
processes. 
 The broad umbrella of ‘novelty processing’ has been used to describe a few potentially distinct 
phenomena.  One is a differential response to novel as opposed to familiar stimuli, which refers to stimuli 
with different amounts of previous exposure; a word being seen for the first time in an experiment is 
novel compared to a word that has already been studied.  This will be referred to as stimulus-based 
novelty.  A second is a similar finding but where novel refers to unexpected or unusual stimuli given the 
experimental context; a green picture presented in a stream of red pictures is novel in this way.  This will 
be referred to as contextual novelty.  Finally, novelty processing can refer to the intention to find novelty 
as opposed to the goal of finding familiar or studied stimuli; the latter ‘familiarity processing’ is what 
occurs in typical recognition memory experiments.  This will be referred to as novelty orientation.  Each 
of these novelty processes has been empirically associated with the hippocampus, although other authors 
have questioned if the first two actually represent a novelty process per se and the third has received little 
attention.  For that reason, three experiments were designed that investigated novelty as a goal, or more 
specifically as a retrieval orientation, in contrast to a familiarity-based goal. 
 Previous research has found that participants are easily able to follow familiarity and novelty 
instructions; as demonstrated by eye movement data they will direct viewing to a familiar stimulus when 
asked to and will similarly direct viewing away from a familiar stimulus when asked to look at novel 
stimuli.  However, familiar stimuli seem to automatically grab viewing such that it takes longer to direct 
viewing away.  This paradigm (Ryan et al, 2007) was examined using patients with hippocampal damage 
and intact comparison participants.  Famous and non-famous faces were used to provide different levels 
of stimulus-based novelty, some famous faces were not seen during study to provide a source of 
unexpectedness or contextual novelty, and viewing instructions were manipulated to provide a contrast 
between novelty and familiarity orientation.  Eye movement data revealed that both amnesic and 
comparison participants directed different levels of viewing to the different types of faces, supporting the 
idea that they varied in their memory content.  Hippocampal damage did reduce the ability of the patients 
to distinguish familiar faces from novel lures, but both groups showed the same relative viewing to the 
studied famous, studied non-famous, and unexpected famous faces; hippocampal damage had no 
influence on stimulus-based or contextual novelty.  Similarly, both groups directed viewing properly 
following the familiarity and novelty instructions.   
 Recent evidence has suggested that the hippocampus may be important for memory over a short 
delay in addition to the long-held view of its role in long-term memory.  These results were examined 
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along with novelty orientation in a second experiment that expanded on the results of the first.  Complex 
computer-generated stimuli were used instead of faces, and retrieval orientation was manipulated at the 
trial level instead of across blocks.  Behaviorally the amnesic group performed normally when memory 
was tested after a short unfilled delay, but they were impaired after a long delay.  Eye movement data 
showed that both groups were again able to direct viewing appropriately given the instruction.  Critically, 
there was again no evidence that hippocampal lesions impaired performance under novelty instructions, 
either behaviorally or with regard to eye movements.  Moreover, the eye movement data suggest that 
participants may have a preference to search for the familiar item at test, raising the question of the 
necessity of ‘novelty processing’ in addition to familiarity. 
 While other authors have questioned the stimulus-based and contextual novelty effects found in 
previous research, the first two experiments here implied that novelty processing as a retrieval orientation 
may also be an unnecessary construct.  The final experiment tested that hypothesis more directly using a 
paradigm that has demonstrated the later consequences of instantiating a particular retrieval strategy or 
goal.  College-age adults studied two lists of words, one under deep (semantic) instructions and the other 
under shallow (word length) instructions.  They then received separate recognition memory tests for these 
two lists with the knowledge that the old words came from those distinct lists.  Previous research (Jacoby 
et al, 2005a) has shown that participants are able to use this information to focus their memory search, 
which has the effect of producing deep and shallow processing on the foil items on the two recognition 
tests; this is demonstrated on a final test where the deep foils are better recognized than shallow foils 
(called the memory for foils effect).  The current experiment manipulated novelty orientation during the 
middle phase when participants performed the two recognition tests, with one group receiving familiarity 
instructions and a second receiving novelty instructions.  The familiarity group replicated the previous 
results, demonstrating both a depth of processing effect on the initial recognition tests and a memory for 
foils effect on the final test.  The novelty group produced a reduced depth of processing effect but a 
normal memory for foils effect.  The intention to look for novel stimuli thus does appear to produce 
different effects than the intention to look for familiar stimuli, although in a complicated manner. 
 The results described here extend the novelty processing literature by attempting to differentiate 
familiarity and novelty retrieval orientations.  Other authors have suggested that novelty processing is not 
really about novelty at all, but more of a priming effect; that is, brain regions such as the hippocampus are 
conducting less of their normal memory processing on familiar stimuli than on novel stimuli.  The results 
of the first two experiments support that view; hippocampal lesions had no effect on novelty processing 
regardless of how novelty was defined.  The third experiment instead demonstrated that novelty 
processing can be distinct from typical memory processing.  I discuss why, however, it is unclear that this 
represents some manner of novelty processing per se as opposed to representing a shift in the meta-
mnemonic processes engaged by participants.  While the data are unable to definitively determine 
whether novelty and familiarity orientations are distinct goals or strategies, I demonstrate that novelty 
processing is not a necessary construct at the mnemonic level. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. A Brief Overview of Relational Memory 
 Memory comes in a variety of flavors.  Some researchers study motor learning, others semantic 
networks and language (see figure 1.1 for a partial taxonomy).  My work has focused broadly on 
declarative memory.  More specifically I have typically focused on a subset of declarative memory called 
relational memory and how it relates to a part of the brain called the hippocampus.  Declarative memory 
is typically described as being what it sounds like: memory that supports anything a person might declare 
or explicitly state, such as a fact or personal event.  Memory for facts, such as Lincoln being the 16
th
 
President, have typically lost any associated context and are called semantic memories.  One doesn’t need 
to remember when or where they learned that Lincoln was the 16
th
 President to express that knowledge.  
Memory for personal events, such as what one had for breakfast yesterday, is considered to be an episodic 
memory and is typically contrasted to semantic memory in that context is very important.  The memory is 
associated with yesterday, not any day, and remembering breakfast involves some manner of ‘mental time 
travel’ or re-experiencing of the event.  The breakfast memory might be associated not only with the time 
and what was eaten but also who else was there, what was going on during breakfast, or what happened 
before or afterward. 
 
Figure 1.1.  A partial taxonomy of memory systems.  From Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991. 
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 Relational memory is thought to support both these kinds of memories, although in different 
ways.  Relational memory is the ability to bind together different, arbitrary pieces of information into a 
single whole that can be flexibly used with other information (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; 
Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001).  For example, when someone meets a new acquaintance they need to 
remember the name that goes with the face.  Faces and names are arbitrary associations; given a picture of 
an unknown person, it is unlikely that a name would jump to mind or that it would be the correct name.  
This is why relational memory is fundamental to episodic memory: a person must be able to combine 
arbitrary elements (e.g. who was at breakfast with the day or what was eaten or the contents of the 
newspaper) to form a complete episodic memory.  It is unusual to think of them this way, but facts 
(semantic memories) begin as arbitrary pieces of information.  When someone learns that Lincoln was 
President, those words previously had nothing to do with each other and must be remembered by brute 
force.  After repeated use, however, such combinations become inflexible facts and no longer rely on 
relational memory to be remembered.  Consistent with this description, amnesic patients with relational 
memory deficits have difficulty learning new semantic information after their injury (e.g. Gabrieli, 
Cohen, & Corkin, 1988).  On the other hand, they have no trouble remembering semantic information 
learned sufficiently before their injury.  In contrast, amnesic patients have difficulty remembering 
episodes from before their injury with the full detail and experience that defines episodic memory; the 
memories appear to have become more like semantic memories (Rosenbaum et al., 2008).  Amnesia has 
made it difficult, if not impossible, for these patients to create new episodic or semantic memories, as well 
as retrieve episodic memories.  The critical aspect of these results is the importance of contextual detail. 
 Beyond describing a kind of memory, the relational memory theory provided by Cohen and 
Eichenbaum also makes claims about which brain regions support different psychological processes.  The 
‘items’, or individual pieces of information themselves (such as the face or name of a new acquaintance), 
are processed by regions of cortex in the medial temporal lobes (MTLs).  Specifically, it is thought that 
the perirhinal cortex creates item memories.  The actual combining of items (or of items to other 
information) into a relational memory is accomplished by the hippocampus.  The hippocampus differs 
from the perirhinal cortex in a variety of ways, but there are two key features that allow it to support 
relational memory: its position in the brain and its own internal structure (Brown & Aggleton, 2001; 
Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Lisman & Otmakhova, 2001).  The hippocampus is located 
in the MTL at the end of a number of sensory processing pathways.  The most studied is the ventral visual 
pathway, which takes visual information from the occipital lobe and passes it through inferior temporal 
cortex and into the perirhinal cortex.  Meanwhile, more spatial aspects of the environment seem to pass 
through a dorsal pathway that includes the parietal cortex and into the parahippocampal cortex.  These 
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two types of information then pass into entorhinal cortex, remaining differentiated, and on into the 
hippocampus.  Similar stories can be told for the other sensory modalities.  Thus the hippocampus has all 
the information necessary to form a complete episodic memory: visual information sounds, smells, spatial 
locations, and so on.  The importance of the hippocampus’ structure is discussed later. 
 It is worth noting that the hippocampus has not always been associated with relational memory.  
Since initial reports of memory loss in patient H.M. after his hippocampus was removed during surgery 
(Scoville & Milner, 1957, the hippocampus has been described as supporting cognitive mapping, spatial 
maps, declarative memory, episodic memory, explicit memory, and recollection as well as relational 
memory (Cohen et al., 1999; Konkel & Cohen, 2009).  In fact, to the extent that all of these claims are 
plausible, they support the relational memory theory because each reflects a portion of the theory.  While 
spatial accounts of hippocampal function have been prominent over the years, particularly in animal 
research, it is notable that memory for locations is one kind of relational memory.  As has already been 
noted, relational memory is a fundamental feature of episodic and declarative memory.  Recollection is a 
more recent process attributed to the hippocampus (Eichenbaum et al., 2007); recollection is the ability to 
remember the context or details associated with a particular stimulus.  It is frequently compared to 
familiarity, which is remembering that a stimulus was seen before but without any subjective ability to 
remember the details of the prior event.  For example, one might study the word ‘omelette’ and be 
reminded of breakfast during the weekend.  If this memory comes back again when omelette is seen at 
test, it should be called ‘recollected’.  If the person feels that omelette was studied before but has no 
details to go along with it, it should be called ‘familiar’.  Recollection is also typically invoked if a person 
is able to remember the font color a word was presented in or the side of the screen is was displayed on 
(examples of source memory).  Given the nature of relational memory described above, the connection 
between it and recollection should be obvious.  One key difference between relational memory theory and 
a number of these alternative accounts (such as recollection, or more important to this thesis, novelty 
processing) is that the other theories function at the level of psychological processes as opposed to 
representations.  Further discussion of this issue is found in the conclusion section. 
1.2. Recognition Memory:  Strength or Something More 
 Despite the fact that the hippocampus appears to play a role in a wide range of situations (such as 
language (Duff, Hengst, Tranel, & Cohen, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007) or 
imagination (Hassabis et al., 2007)), most of the recent debate over hippocampal function is based on 
evidence from recognition memory tests.  After being exposed to a list of stimuli, participants are 
presented with a test list consisting of both previously encountered (‘old’) and not recently experienced 
(‘new’) stimuli.  The participant is then asked to determine if any given stimulus was previously seen or 
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not.  This type of test can be contrasted to recall, in which the participant is asked to generate the studied 
material directly from memory.  While recall is broadly accepted to rely on the hippocampus (and be 
related to recollection), recognition provides a more murky case.  Since participants get to see each 
stimulus, they have the opportunity to feel that they have seen it before without retrieving any detailed 
information about the episode (the process of familiarity described earlier).  Thus recognition may rely on 
a combination of memory processes, and perhaps equivalently a number of brain regions.  This point has 
been heavily debated, however (Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004; Wixted, 2007). 
 Before even addressing the issue of what brain regions support recognition memory, however, is 
the contentious issue of what psychological processes underlie recognition.  As implied above, one theory 
is that recollection and familiarity combine to support recognition (thus commonly called the dual-process 
theory), with the question being how much of which process is brought to bear in different circumstances 
(Yonelinas, 2002).  The main alternative theory is the signal detection theory (SDT; Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005) of recognition, which is primarily described as a single-process theory (although, see 
Wixted, 2007).  In the SDT framework, the single process can best be described as matching (Shiffrin & 
Steyvers, 1997 describe a compatible mathematical model).  An incoming stimulus, such as one seen on a 
recognition test trial, is compared to potentially every representation in memory.  The comparison process 
generates a single ‘match’ value, or evidence that the stimulus has been seen before.  This evidence value 
is then judged as to whether or not it is sufficient to actually call the stimulus ‘old’.  The decision is based 
on two distributions of memory evidence.  One distribution is made of new items and is typically called 
the noise distribution due to SDT’s origin in psychophysics.  Because of the many items stored in 
memory, even a completely novel stimulus (such as a non-word) has some amount of evidence that it is 
actually old due to it being similar to something that has been seen before.  Of course, items differ in how 
‘old’ they seem; a very unusual non-word like ‘zyzyzyz’ may have elicit little evidence and seem 
obviously novel whereas a non-word with typical features like ‘tham’ may be a more attractive lure.  On 
the other hand, actually studied words elicit more of a match because they actually exist in memory and 
were recently activated.  Due to factors like attention during study, inherent characteristics of the item 
(like word frequency), and person-specific idiosyncrasies, old items also take on a range of evidence 
values and thus create a ‘signal’ distribution.  The match value that a particular item evokes is compared 
to the signal and noise distributions (or alternatively a criterion level of evidence established in relation to 
those distributions) to determine which one the item is more likely to have come from, and a decision is 
made (see figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2.  An illustration of the signal detection theory view of memory.  The noise distribution (on the 
left) is made of unstudied items while the signal distribution (on the right) is made of studied items.  
Locations further to the right on the scale have more evidence of having come from the signal 
distribution.  The ability to discriminate old from new items can be evaluated with the distance between 
the means of the two distributions, called d’.  Any individual item is evaluated by comparing its evidence 
value to a criterion for responding “old” or “new”.  The figure shows 6 criteria points, as might be used 
when subjects also provide a rating of how confident they are in their response (e.g. “sure new”, 
“probably new”, “guess new”, “guess”, “guess old”, “probably old”, “sure old”).  Any item with an 
evidence value between cb and ca would generate a ‘probably old’ response.  Illustration from Banks 
(1970). 
 Behaviorally speaking, SDT models typically account for recognition performance better than 
dual-process models (Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, & Adams, 1999; Hilford, Glanzer, Kim, & DeCarlo, 2002).  
However, dual-process models provide very similar fits as well as additional theoretical accounts of 
performance (Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002).  Additionally, evidence from neuroimaging and lesion 
studies suggests dissociations in the brain regions that support recollection and familiarity during 
recognition testing (Eichenbaum et al., 2007).  However, a different perspective also suggests that a 
single-process view of recognition memory may not be correct.  The matching process, at least as 
described by many models, is strictly a quantitative process.  The test stimulus is compared to everything 
in memory, generates an evidence value, and the evidence is compared to some criterion for making an 
‘old’ response.  Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, & Rhodes (2005), in contrast, proposed that the recognition 
process can differ under different circumstances to reflect what they called source-constrained retrieval.  
For example, if a participants knows that any old items on a test were studied under one condition instead 
of another (such as aurally as opposed to visually), the participant can use that information to guide and 
limit his memory search.  This is similar to how recall might be performed; given a cue ‘tell me the words 
from the list you just saw’, participants can limit their search to words seen in the recent past to retrieve 
what was studied.  If participants can make different kinds of memory searches, and perform different 
kinds of processes on stimuli during this search as suggested by Jacoby et al. (2005), this implies a 
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qualitative aspect to retrieval that is not present in single-process accounts of recognition.  It is not 
sufficient to describe a stimulus’ status in memory or likelihood of being retrieved via a single strength 
value.  The circumstances of the test as well as the different strategies that participants may use must also 
be taken into consideration. 
 Perhaps due to the advent of functional neuroimaging, the role of the hippocampus in recognition 
memory has become a popular research focus.  More importantly, the relationship has become a two-way 
street as recognition tasks are used to examine the function of the hippocampus (see reviews by (Davachi, 
2006; Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Henson, 2005; Konkel & Cohen, 
2009; Mayes, Montaldi, & Migo, 2007; Squire, Wixted, & Clark, 2007), and entire issues of the journal 
Hippocampus, such as November 2010).  Single-process theories of memory have been able to account 
for much of the behavioral data in this literature, at least compared to dual-process theory, and have been 
resilient in the face of contradictory data.  However, when the full range of the hippocampal literature is 
considered, as well as evidence of meta-mnemonic effects like those found by Jacoby et al. (2005), it is 
clear that a single-process or strength-based account of recognition memory is incomplete.  Thus SDT is 
better suited as a measurement technique than as the basis for a theory of memory function.   
1.3. Novelty and Familiarity 
 While the hippocampus is typically thought of as a memory module, and the discussion so far has 
largely been in regards to how the hippocampus allows us to retrieve what we have seen before, there is a 
somewhat separate body of research that contends it also does the opposite: it tells us what we have not 
seen before.  These two phenomena will be called familiarity processing and novelty processing.  
Familiarity processing refers to the processes engaged when a familiar stimulus is seen, not to be 
confused with the process of familiarity discussed above in regards to recollection.  Novelty processing, 
on the other hand, refers to the processes engaged when a novel stimulus is seen.  Due to the importance 
of exploration and learning new information, novelty processing has been called an essential function for 
survival (Knight & Nakada, 1998).  Broadly speaking, familiarity processing can be viewed as what 
researchers discuss in regards to recognition tests: retrieval strategies, memory evaluations, decision 
making, and so on.  Intuitively, however, novelty seems to be the ‘other side of the coin’ to familiarity; if 
something is familiar, it is not novel, and vice versa (Habib, 2001).  Such a conclusion would be 
reasonable under a SDT model of recognition since any stimulus possesses only a single strength value in 
memory.  A very familiar stimulus would be, by definition, not very novel.  If novelty and familiarity 
exist only to different degrees, wouldn’t they evoke the same psychological processes only to different 
degrees?  As discussed previously, however, the single-process view is unappealing as a complete view of 
recognition memory, and so perhaps familiarity and novelty are separable in a multi-process view of 
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recognition that includes various mnemonic and meta-mnemonic functions.  Thus the question at hand is: 
do we need to have separate novelty detection and recognition processes, or is recognition memory alone 
sufficient? 
 Beyond the intuitive account just described, some confusion over the distinction between novelty 
and familiarity is due to the use of a broad term (‘novelty detection’ or ‘novelty processing’) applied to 
potentially different phenomena.  Kumaran & Maguire (2007) and Nyberg (2005) identify three different 
kinds of novelty, which will serve as a framework for discussing novelty processing relative to other 
functions, namely relational memory. 
Stimulus novelty:  Stimulus novelty is used to describe the situation where a single item is new.  The 
strongest possible example is for a completely novel stimulus, such as a previously unseen face.  
However, most research has focused on what might called ‘experimentally novel’ stimuli: stimuli like 
words that have been seen before and already exist in memory, but have not been seen previously in the 
experimental context.  It is unclear if these two kinds of novelty should be grouped together (the ideas of 
associative and contextual novelty, discussed next, argue that perhaps they shouldn’t).  Stimulus novelty 
effects are usually found by comparing some measure of processing of novel stimuli to a measure of 
processing of familiar stimuli.  This is commonly done with functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and used to find the brain regions responsible for processing novelty.  An early example (using 
positron emission tomography, PET) comes from Tulving, Markowitsch, Craik, Habib, & Houle (1996).  
On the first day of the experiment, participants were shown a series of presumably unfamiliar color 
pictures.  On the second day, participants saw blocks of stimuli consisting mostly of these now-familiar 
pictures or mostly of novel pictures while brain data were collected.  Comparing the novel blocks to the 
familiar blocks, the researchers found that the hippocampus, amongst a variety of areas, was more active 
during the novel blocks.  Very similar paradigms were carried out with blocked (Stern et al., 1996) and 
event-related fMRI (Kirchhoff, Wagner, Maril, & Stern, 2000) and the hippocampus was consistently 
found to respond to novelty.   
 However, there is reason to believe that the hippocampus is not actually critical for processing 
stimulus novelty.  Even in those early reports (Stern et al., 1996; Tulving et al., 1996), the authors noted 
that the hippocampus may be active due to encoding, particularly for the complex materials used as 
stimuli.  Kirchhoff et al. (2000) extended that intuition by demonstrating that many of the same brain 
regions that responded to novelty, including the hippocampus, also were active in a subsequent memory 
analysis.  That is, the same regions that appear to be responsible for novelty processing are also 
responsible for memory encoding.  This raises the question of if the hippocampus is involved in novelty 
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processing per se or if it is carrying out its usual role in memory formation and simply does so more for 
novel materials (Kumaran & Maguire, 2009). 
 Another issue with stimulus novelty is its relationship with priming (Habib, 2001; Ranganath & 
Rainer, 2003).  As described above, novelty activation in fMRI is found by comparing novel to familiar 
stimuli.  This is exactly the same procedure for finding priming effects in the brain.  Priming effects are 
associated with reduced activity to repeated stimuli (also called repetition suppression or adaptation); it is 
thought that reduced activity reflects more efficient processing (Henson, 2003).  However, this is exactly 
the same pattern of results that is used to define novelty processing, more activity for novel than familiar 
stimuli.  Thus it is impossible to distinguish the two at the data level; they can only be distinguished 
conceptually and any given research article tends to approach their data from one viewpoint and not the 
other.  In fact, Kumaran & Maguire (2009) have suggested using novelty effects to determine 
hippocampal function in a manner very similar to how priming effects have been used to deduce the 
function of various regions of visual cortex.  In other words, they are suggesting that the novelty effects 
found in the hippocampus are, in fact, a kind of priming or repetition suppression and not at all related to 
novelty processing per se.   
 In summary, there are two issues related to concluding that the hippocampus supports stimulus 
novelty processing: these effects could just be encoding activity, or the effects could be priming.  They 
could reflect both, given that the hippocampus is involved in both encoding and retrieval.  These two 
concerns will carry on into the other varieties of novelty processing. 
Associative novelty: Associative novelty is defined as a novel combination of previously seen items 
(Kumaran & Maguire, 2007).  A common experimental example is word pairs:  pair A-B could be studied 
and later pair C-D; if pair A-D is seen at test it is associatively novel.  The items or elements themselves 
are familiar but the combination as a whole is new.  As has been mentioned, this type of processing seems 
to fit well with relational memory theories of hippocampal function.  The hippocampus has been 
connected to a variety of types of associations, such as item-item, item-location, and item-time (or 
sequential order) (Konkel & Cohen, 2009; Konkel, Warren, Duff, Tranel, & Cohen, 2008).  Providing 
quite the parallel within the novelty literature, the hippocampus has been associated with item-item 
(Köhler, Danckert, Gati, & Menon, 2005), item-location (Köhler et al., 2005), and item-time novelty 
processing (Kumaran & Maguire, 2006).  Kumaran and Maguire (2007) take this evidence as a sign that if 
the hippocampus is involved in novelty processing at all, it should be associative (relational) novelty. 
 While a broad view of the data supports an association-based (as opposed to item-based) view of 
hippocampal function, it is still unclear if the hippocampus should be associated with novelty processing 
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in this domain.  As noted previously, a novelty processing view needs to contend with fact that it is 
conflated with both encoding and priming.  That is, the relational memory theory would predict that a 
new combination of studied stimuli would need to be bound together, requiring hippocampal activity.  
Previously studied combinations will not need as much binding (and in fact could eventually become 
independent of the hippocampus as semantic memories).  Thus increased hippocampal activity for novel 
associations is not a surprising result and need not be a consequence of a special novelty process.  This 
conclusion holds whether one views the results as encoding or priming.   
Contextual novelty: Contextual novelty refers to a stimulus being unexpected given the context it occurs 
in.  The primary paradigm examining this kind of novelty is perhaps the novelty oddball paradigm, often 
studied with event-related potentials (ERPs) but also occasionally with fMRI (Knight & Nakada, 1998).  
In the novelty oddball paradigm, three types of stimuli are presented to the participant: standards, targets, 
and oddballs.  The standard is a single stimulus (such as a pure tone) presented the majority of the time 
(perhaps 80% of trials) that the participant is told requires no response.  The target is also a single 
stimulus (such as a pure tone at a different pitch) presented infrequently (10% of trials) that the 
participant is told to respond to.  The oddball is the actual stimulus of interest, however.  The oddball is 
infrequently presented, like the target, but is usually of a different character than the target or standard 
(such as a dog bark or car horn or other environmental sound).  The oddball is unexpected due to its rarity 
and distinct character relative to the majority of stimuli presented on other trials.  It is also literally 
unexpected since participants are often not told that it will be presented.  The oddball stimulus has been 
found to evoke its own ERP component, the P3a or novelty P3.  The novelty P3 is considered to reflect an 
orienting response or capture of attention by an unexpected stimulus (Knight & Nakada, 1998).  
Important to the current discussion, the novelty P3 is reduced or eliminated in patients with hippocampal 
damage (Knight, 1996).  Additionally, hippocampal activity showed a similar pattern of results to those 
found in ERPs (namely, habituation) in an fMRI investigation of the oddball paradigm (Yamaguchi, Hale, 
D’Esposito, & Knight, 2004). 
 However, similar caveats apply to a contextual novelty account of hippocampal function as were 
discussed with associative novelty.  Indeed, it is unclear if item-context associations are fundamentally 
different from other item associations mentioned earlier.  The context provided by an experimental 
session can easily be viewed as temporal or more concrete pieces of information (the location of the 
testing, the experimenter, what the room looks like, other items in the experimental list, etc.).  Items to be 
remembered, or simply presented as in the novelty oddball paradigm, can be associated to that 
information as much as to experimenter-manipulated information like other words or computer screen 
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locations.  Due to its role in relational memory, the hippocampus would be expected to form a memory 
for the ongoing context of an experiment just as much as it would for other associations. 
 In short, at least three forms of novelty have fallen under the umbrella of ‘novelty processing’ and 
each has been associated with the hippocampus.  However, each of these faces issues of interpretability.  
Stimulus and associative novelty effects are intertwined with priming and encoding while associative and 
contextual novelty effects are already predicted by the relational memory theory, which additionally 
predicts a wide range of results throughout the literature. 
1.4. Searching for Novelty: Retrieval Orientation 
 If novelty and familiarity processing are two different psychological entities, then they should be 
clearly distinguished in both behavioral and neurological data.  However, the discussion above has raised 
issues at both levels.  Behaviorally, novelty has been called ‘the other side of the coin’ to familiarity 
(Habib, 2001).  Within the brain, novelty effects have been found in regions (such as the hippocampus) 
with other prominent functional roles that provide other, and perhaps better, accounts of the data.  At any 
level, it is unclear if novelty can be separated from memory encoding or priming.  In sum, it is unclear if 
novelty processing needs to exist as a psychological construct if familiarity (or recognition memory) 
already explains all the same results. 
 However, another route to studying novelty processing is available.  If novelty processing is 
different from familiarity processing, or if novelty is a feature or characteristic of stimuli different from 
familiarity, then participants should be able to invoke that process or look for those features when 
circumstances permit.  As described previously, Jacoby et al. (2005) demonstrated that participants can 
constrain their memory search to certain categories or types of information.  This happens even though 
the participants were not asked to, and may be a subconscious strategy.  Thus, if they are in fact different, 
participants should be able to institute a ‘novelty orientation’ that is distinct from a ‘familiarity 
orientation’.  Only a few studies have compared these two.  (Dudukovic & Wagner, 2007) asked 
participants to study a list of words and then take a recognition memory test with two types of trials.  On 
each test trial participants saw three words, two studied and one novel, but before the trial the participant 
was cued to choose the novel word or the more recently studied word.  Thus the stimuli on each test trial 
were identical but the participant modulated his retrieval orientation.  The hippocampus was significantly 
more active during novelty than recency judgment trials.  Thus it appears that the hippocampus might 
respond differently to novelty orientation than (temporal) source memory orientation.  However, an 
earlier study from the same lab (Dobbins & Wagner, 2005) found that the hippocampus was equally 
active for novelty and a different source (task performed at study) memory orientations, and a study 
11 
 
investigating working memory (Monk et al., 2002) similarly found that the hippocampus was equally 
active for match-to-sample and non-match-to-sample tasks.   
 Given the discussion above, the manipulation of retrieval orientation while keeping stimulus 
content identical is a critical part of these studies.  The evidence for novelty processing as a distinct 
function was all based on stimulus characteristics: a particular stimulus (such as the car horn in the 
oddball paradigm) was novel or familiar, and it was assumed that the stimulus itself evokes different 
processing.  There would be better reason to distinguish novelty and familiarity processing if they could 
be brought to bear on any stimulus, as appears to be the case (at least quantitatively) in the study by 
Dudukovic and Wagner (2007).  Duncan, Curtis, & Davachi (2009) have suggested that intention may in 
fact be the basis for seemingly contradictory fMRI results involving hippocampal activity.  Despite the 
common finding of more activity for novel than familiar stimuli, it is not uncommon to find the opposite: 
more activity for familiar than novel stimuli (e.g., Giovanello, Schnyer, & Verfaellie, 2004; see Henson, 
2005 for a discussion of the old-new effect).  Duncan et al. (2009) note that this seems to occur in 
situations when familiarity is behaviorally relevant, such as during intentional retrieval. To test this 
hypothesis, Duncan et al. (2009) developed a working memory paradigm where participants viewed a pair 
of objects and then received a signal telling them to either maintain the objects or flip their spatial 
locations.  After a delay, participants saw either the same items in the same locations as at study, the same 
items in flipped locations, one old and one new object, or the same objects with one in a new location.  
Thus a studied stimulus could be a goal match or a goal mismatch depending on instructions, as could a 
novel stimulus.  The new item and new position conditions provided trials with stronger perceptual 
novelty.  Duncan et al. (2009) found only match signals in the hippocampus: it was more active for 
familiar stimuli in the ‘maintain’ condition and novel stimuli in the ‘swap’ condition than for if the 
stimulus mismatched the goal.  Further, no hippocampal region demonstrated mismatch activity.  
However, an array of MTL areas demonstrated novelty effects by being more active during the new 
object and new location conditions than any matching condition, replicating the stimulus/associative 
novelty response discussed earlier.  These results demonstrate that the hippocampus can show both 
familiarity and novelty effects depending on the participants’ goal; familiarity activity should occur under 
a familiarity orientation and novelty activity should occur under a novelty orientation.   
1.5. Current Work 
 Novelty effects have been found consistently in the hippocampus, yet their interpretation is 
ambiguous.  There is wide support for the role of the hippocampus in relational memory, and it is unclear 
if it additionally supports some manner of novelty detection or processing.  The little research that has 
extended into the realm of goal states is promising, but conflicted.  Duncan et al. (2009) found that the 
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hippocampus is sensitive to goal state, but only in regard to matching expectations.  Perhaps supporting 
that match enhancement hypothesis, Dobbins and Wagner (2005) and Monk et al. (2002) found that the 
hippocampus was equally active under a novelty orientation as a variety of familiarity orientations.  
However, Dudukovic and Wagner (2007) found that the hippocampus was more active under a novelty 
orientation than a temporal orientation, suggesting that the hippocampus may respond to differences in 
goal state.  More research is necessary to determine if the hippocampus is critical for instantiating 
different goal orientations, particularly in regards to novelty. 
 An additional limitation of the majority of novelty research is that it relies on fMRI and ERP data.  
While these methods provide data and test hypotheses that cannot be attempted with other techniques, 
they are inherently correlational.  A stronger test is provided by examining novelty processing in patients 
with brain lesions.  For example, Knight (1996) found that the novelty P3 component is missing in 
hippocampal lesion patients, suggesting that the hippocampus is necessary for detecting contextual 
novelty.  More directly tied to the current work, Freed & Corkin (1988) tested patient H.M. with both 
familiarity and novelty-focused versions of recognition tasks.  Having studied a list of pictures earlier, 
both H.M. and intact comparison participants performed yes/no, yes/no-new (participants looked for and 
responded positively to novel pictures), two-alternative forced choice, and two-alternative non-match 
(pick the novel picture) forced choice recognition tests.  While the comparison group performed equally 
well regardless of the familiarity/novelty instruction, patient H.M. performed better, and in fact at normal 
levels, under the novelty orientation.  The authors suggest that H.M. may have a novelty preference 
instead of a deficit, which appears to conflict with the conclusions drawn from the novelty literature 
discussed so far. 
 The current work aims to extend the novelty literature further in the realm of goal states by 
testing patients with hippocampal lesions.  If the hippocampus is fundamentally involved in processing 
novelty, then hippocampal damage should impair the patients’ ability to instantiate a novelty orientation.  
In fact, if the Freed and Corkin (1988) result generalizes, patients may even perform better under novelty 
instructions.  However, following the relational memory theory of hippocampal function, it would be 
predicted that patients will not be impaired or benefit under novelty instructions.  Another reason to 
predict a null result is that goals and retrieval orientation are generally understood to be controlled by the 
prefrontal cortex (e.g. Miller & Cohen, 2001) and not the hippocampus.  Instead, amnesic patients should 
demonstrate a more generic memory impairment. 
 A first test of these hypotheses will come from a paradigm developed by Ryan et al. (2007).  
Participants studied a list of faces containing both famous and non-famous people.  The following test 
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trials consisted of three faces.  Excluding occasional catch trials consisting of three non-studied, non-
famous faces, all test trials contained two completely novel (non-studied, non-famous) faces and one 
familiar face.  The familiar face could be a studied non-famous face, a studied famous face, or a non-
studied famous face.  In one block participants were asked to look at the familiar face while in another 
they were asked to look at any novel face; eye movements were recorded to detect where participants 
were looking.  This manipulation across blocks represents a manipulation of orientation; the participant is 
either attempting to find a familiar face or a novel face.  In young adults Ryan et al. (2007) found that 
participants are able to find familiar faces quickly when instructed to do so; regardless of why the face 
was familiar, the familiar face drew more viewing than the novel faces only half a second after the faces 
appeared on-screen.  Participants were also able to follow the novelty instruction, but the eye data 
suggested that something else may be going on.  Eye movements away from the familiar face were 
relatively delayed, only dropping below the level of novel faces after a full second of trial time.  
Additionally, non-studied but famous faces were extremely delayed and only rejected after three seconds 
of viewing.  Thus Ryan et al. (2007) found that 1) participants are able to direct their viewing according 
to their goal state, 2) memory has an obligatory effect on viewing such that familiar faces appear to draw 
viewing and are easier to look at than to look away from, and 3) contextually unexpected stimuli like the 
non-studied but famous faces may be especially difficult to reject.   
 The same paradigm will be used here with amnesic patients as well as intact comparison 
participants.  This paradigm provides a number of benefits relevant to the current goals.  First, it relies on 
eye movements instead of overt behavioral responses.  Eye movements are an excellent way to gather 
data from a population like amnesic patients (Hannula et al., 2010), especially under an overt demand on 
their memory.  Second, there are three kinds of novelty in the study that could prove to be affected by 
hippocampal lesions.  Novelty orientation is examined by the instructional manipulation across blocks, 
stimulus novelty is examined by the use of famous and non-famous faces, and contextual novelty is 
examined by testing non-studied but famous faces.  As mentioned previously, the relational memory 
theory predicts that the patients will not demonstrate any goal orientation deficits.  Instead, they may have 
difficulty distinguishing studied faces from non-studied faces, consistent with their memory deficit.  
Despite showing the faces repeatedly during study, their memory impairment may be sufficient to reduce 
performance compared to normal controls.  Additionally, there is the possibility that the patients will 
demonstrate a different pattern of viewing when tested with the non-studied famous faces.  These faces 
appear to be contextually unexpected in young adults; since the hippocampus is associated with relational 
memory and creating the context of a task, the patients may not respond in the same way as the 
comparison group. 
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 A second study will extend the results of the first into the domain of working memory as well as 
generalize by using different materials.  Although the hippocampus has long only been associated with 
long-term memory, recent work has found that lesions can impair performance even on tasks with short or 
no appreciable delays if the conditions are right (Duff et al., 2011; Olson, Moore, Stark, & Chatterjee, 
2006; Olson, Page, Moore, Chatterjee, & Verfaellie, 2006; Voss, Gonsalves, Federmeier, Tranel, & 
Cohen, 2011; Voss, Warren, et al., 2011; Warren, Duff, Jensen, Tranel, & Cohen, 2011; Warren, Duff, 
Tranel, & Cohen, 2010, 2011).  The experiment will also use novel computer-generated stimuli (Konkel 
et al., 2008) as opposed to faces.  While the non-famous faces in experiment 1 are also completely novel, 
they will have been studied extensively before being tested and may be easier to process given the large 
amount of experience people have with processing faces.  The paradigm will involve a series of working 
memory trials with intermixed study trials for a later long-term memory test; the long-term memory test 
trials will be presented after the working memory phase.  After studying a pair of items participants will 
be instructed to choose the familiar or choose the novel item at test; this experiment will thus examine the 
ability to change retrieval orientation trial-to-trial whereas the first experiment examined orientation in a 
more stable manner.  Consistent with long-established results in the memory literature, the amnesic 
patients should perform worse than the comparison group on the long-term memory trials.  It is possible 
that they will also be impaired on the working memory trials given recent research in that area.  However, 
the task does not explicitly test any relational information, so the patients may also perform normally.  
More importantly, a relational view of hippocampal function again predicts that the patients will not be 
impaired in terms of the retrieval orientation manipulation.  Demographic information and 
neuropsychological test results for the patient and comparison participants tested in experiments 1 and 2 
are presented in table 1.1. 
 The final piece of the current work is to investigate the consequences of instantiating a novelty 
orientation.  Many different paradigms demonstrate the effects of exposure to a novel stimulus, such as 
drawing additional viewing (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978) and being remembered better on a later test 
(Kishiyama & Yonelinas, 2003).  However, the memory effects of looking for novel stimuli are far less 
known.  The only experiment I am aware of is a follow-up study to an fMRI experiment by Dudukovic 
and Wagner (2007).  Having demonstrated that the hippocampus, among other areas, is more active when 
participants are looking for a novel stimulus than a more recently seen stimulus, the authors performed a 
behavioral study to further examine the consequences of that orientation.  A separate set of participants 
went through the same paradigm as the fMRI group (studying a list of words and then receiving trial-by-
trial instructions to either choose the novel word or the more recently studied word out of two old and one 
novel words) followed by another test.  This final test contained novel lures from the novelty test trials, 
15 
 
novel lures from the recency test trials, and completely novel lures; participants were told to endorse any 
word seen earlier in the experiment.  Novel lures from novelty trials were endorsed more than lures from 
recency trials, leading the authors to conclude that the hippocampal activity may have reflected encoding 
as well as (or perhaps instead of) attentional effects. 
 To expand on this work, I am adapting the source-constraint experiment described previously by 
Jacoby et al. (2005).  The critical manipulation will occur during the second phase, when participants take 
separate recognition tests for deeply and shallowly studied words.  One group of participants will go 
through the same paradigm and should replicate the memory for foils effect: due to constraining their 
memory search to the appropriate study condition, lures from the deep test receive deep processing during 
the test and are better remembered on a later test than lures from the shallow test.  A second group will go 
through the same initial encoding and final test for lures phases, but perform the tests in the second phase 
under novelty instructions.  If searching for novelty is different from searching for familiarity, then this 
group should demonstrate differences for performance during the second and/or third phases due to the 
differences in their memory search.  I hypothesize that a novelty orientation may shift participants away 
from deeper or more thorough memory searches; they may be less likely to constrain their memory search 
or engage in recollection.  Instead they will focus on making simple yes/no decisions instead of 
considering where the old items come from.  If this is true, the novelty orientation group may demonstrate 
reduced depth of processing as well as memory for foils effects due to their lack of constrained memory 
search. 
ID Etiology Gender Handedness Onset Education WAIS 
VIQ 
WAIS 
PIQ 
WAIS 
FIQ 
WMS 
GMI 
WMS 
DMI 
1846 Anoxia F R 1993 14 89 79 84 57 62 
2308 HSE M L 1999 16 95 78 87 45 48 
2363 Anoxia M R 1998 16 112 83 98 73 74 
2563 Anoxia M L 2000 16 98 105 102 75 80 
1846c -------- F R ------- 16 122 155 143 120 ----- 
2308c -------- M L ------- 16 112 113 113 114 ----- 
2363c -------- M R ------- 16 115 98 108 122 ----- 
2563c -------- M L ------- 16 135 91 115 98 ----- 
 
Table 1.1.  Demographic and neuropsychological data for the patients and comparison participants (noted 
by a ‘c’ following the ID for the matched patient) tested in experiments 1 and 2.  Note that 2308c and 
2563c are also matches for each other’s patients.  WAIS - Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – III; VIQ – 
verbal IQ; PIQ – performance IQ; FIQ – full IQ; WMS – Wechsler Memory Scale – III; GMI – general 
memory index; DMI – delayed memory index; HSE – herpes simplex encephalitis.  Etiology and onset 
are presented only for the patients.  Education is measured in years.  WMS DMI score was not available 
for the comparison participants.  
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2. The Effects of Hippocampal Lesions on Novelty Orientation 
2.1. Abstract 
 It has long been established that eye movements are sensitive not only to the contents of memory 
but also of goals or intentions.  This feature was leveraged in the current experiment to examine the 
importance of the hippocampus for novelty processing as a retrieval orientation or goal.  Novelty has been 
studied across a variety of paradigms and has consistently been associated with the hippocampus, but 
rarely in the realm of goals.  The current study tested amnesic patients with hippocampal damage to 
neurologically intact control participants.  Both groups studied famous and non-famous faces and then 
were asked to either look at these faces (familiarity orientation) or look at a novel face (novelty 
orientation), following a paradigm used by Ryan et al. (2007).  Eye movements were monitored during 
the test phase to provide sensitive measures of how viewing was affected by both memory content and 
goal.  The results show that hippocampal damage had no effect on the ability of the amnesic patients to 
follow a novelty orientation, although they did show viewing patterns consistent with a memory deficit.  
This result obtained even for a class of familiar stimuli (unstudied but famous faces) that evoke an odd 
pattern of viewing.  We conclude that the hippocampus is not critical for novelty processing at the goal 
level, and following a claim from a recent review of the novelty literature (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007), it 
is possible that the hippocampus is not important for novelty processing at all. 
2.2. Introduction 
 Eye movements have proven very useful in evaluating the contents of memory (Hannula et al., 
2010).  For example, the pattern and duration of eye movements change when participants view a famous 
face as compared to a novel face (e.g. Althoff & Cohen, 1999) or an experimentally-familiar (previously 
studied) as opposed to novel scene (e.g. Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow, & Cohen, 2000; Smith, Hopkins, & 
Squire, 2006).  Eye movements can also demonstrate memory for elements within scenes using either pre-
existing/semantic information (e.g. Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Underwood, Templeman, Lamming, & 
Foulsham, 2008) or within-experiment/episodic information (e.g. Becker & Rasmussen, 2008; Brockmole 
& Henderson, 2006; Ryan et al., 2000).  In short, eye movements are sensitive to the contents of both 
semantic and episodic memory and at both the whole-scene and within-scene scales.  Indeed, eye 
movements have been said to be automatically and obligatorily affected by memory (Ryan, Hannula, & 
Cohen, 2007). 
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 Along with their response to memory, eye movements are also strongly influenced by goals and 
intentions (e.g. Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005).  An extremely simple example is the anti-saccade task.  In this 
task, a visual target appears in the periphery while participants look at fixation.  Participants must then 
override the automatic tendency to look at the target and instead look in the opposite direction.  The anti-
saccade task describes, in essence, only a single eye movement in response to a sudden stimulus onset, 
but goal-directed viewing can also occur with much more complex tasks and materials.  As  described by 
Hannula et al. (2010), Yarbus collected eye movement data while participants viewed the same scene 
under a variety of questions or prompts.  When no particular prompt was given (i.e., free viewing) 
participants tended to look at the large objects and people in the scene.  But if asked how old the people 
were, viewing shifted to focus on the people alone; if asked how wealthy the family was, viewing shifted 
to focus on their clothes and the furniture in the room.  Thus eye movements can also respond to goals; 
when asked to find certain kinds of information, people’s eyes will move in such a way that the sought-
for information can be found.   
 Eye movements are thus a strong choice of technique for studying novelty.  Novelty detection or 
processing has been described as an essential function (Dudukovic & Wagner, 2007; Knight & Nakada, 
1998) and has been examined in a number of paradigms.  Research on novelty has been reviewed several 
times recently (Knight & Nakada, 1998; Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003) with the 
conclusion that the hippocampus is a critical member of a number of brain regions that support novelty 
processing (although see Kumaran & Maguire, 2007, for some potential qualifications).  However, 
novelty processing has rarely been studied as a goal.  If novelty processing is a unique function, then one 
would expect that eye movements would appear different under that goal than under another goal, such as 
looking for familiar information.  Similarly, one might expect that the hippocampus would be critical for 
supporting such eye movements given its involvement in novelty across so many other domains. 
 The current experiment aims to address exactly those two predictions by expanding on research 
conducted by Ryan et al. (2007).  That study reported three different experiments.  In the first, 
participants viewed unfamiliar faces three times before entering a ‘testing’ block.  One group of 
participants was asked to look at and choose a familiar face from an array of two or three faces filled out 
with novel lures, while a second group simply viewed the arrays under no particular instruction.  Ryan et 
al. (2007) found that participants under recognition memory instructions tended to look preferentially at 
the familiar face over the novel faces while the free viewing group showed the opposite pattern.  Thus eye 
movements responded differentially to participants’ goals.  In the second experiment, participants again 
studied a list of faces but in this case there were both unfamiliar as well as famous faces.  Afterward they 
viewed test trials consisting of two novel and one familiar face; the familiar face could be a studied but 
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non-famous face, a studied and famous face, or a unstudied but famous face.  They were told to choose 
any familiar face.  While studied familiar faces were selected with near-perfect accuracy, unstudied but 
famous faces were only chosen 57% of the time.  Eye movement data (from correct trials only) indicated 
that any familiar face quickly drew viewing, being fixated longer than novel faces as soon as 500 
milliseconds after stimulus onset.  Indeed, the duration of the very first fixation to a face was longer if 
that face was familiar compared to novel faces.   
These results stand in contrast to those from the third experiment, which followed exactly the 
same structure except participants were asked to not look at any familiar face.  In that case, viewing of 
familiar faces dropped off quickly with fixations to novel faces lasting longer than fixations to familiar 
faces.  This occurred more quickly for studied famous faces (after 1000 milliseconds) than studied non-
famous faces (after 2000 milliseconds), but the pattern of viewing for unstudied famous faces was more 
odd: they evoked longer fixations than novel faces early, within the first second of viewing, and were 
only rejected (viewed less than novel faces) nearly four seconds into the trial.  Similarly, studied famous 
faces were found to evoke shorter fixations than novel faces on the second fixation to a face, but this was 
not true for the unstudied famous faces, which were viewed just as much as the novel faces.  Across the 
three experiments, Ryan et al. (2007) provided ample evidence that eye movements respond to the goals 
of the participants.  But due to how quickly the effects occur, and the differences between the second and 
third experiments, they concluded that memory has an automatic effect in driving eye movements. 
The current experiment aims to expand on the Ryan et al. (2007) results and address the role of 
the hippocampus in novelty goal processing by testing the same paradigm on patients with amnesia due to 
hippocampal damage.  Ryan et al. (2007) demonstrated that participants can follow instructions to look at 
novel stimuli (or, more specifically, to not look at familiar stimuli), but found eye movement data that 
suggest that ‘familiarity processing’ can, in some circumstances, have priority even under novelty 
instructions.  We aim to replicate their most striking finding, the difficulty in rejecting famous faces 
simply because they were not studied in that experimental session.  Additionally, if novelty processing is 
broadly supported by the hippocampus, it would be predicted that amnesic patients would have difficulty 
following novelty instructions or would demonstrate different eye movement patterns under novelty 
instructions compared to a control group.   
2.3. Methods 
2.3.1. Participants 
The participants included three patients (two men, one woman) with amnesia following damage 
limited largely to the hippocampus.  They have been described in detail in several papers by ourselves and 
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colleagues (patients 1846, 2363, and 2563; Konkel et al, 2008; Allen et al, 2006; see table 1.1).  In short, 
each has damage to the hippocampus subsequent to a hypoxic/anoxic episode.  Patients 2363 and 2563 
suffered anoxia due to heart attack while patient 1846 had an allergic reaction.  Memory impairments 
were confirmed with standardized tests such as the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS).  While performance 
on the WMS was very impaired, performance on intelligence (such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale) and executive function tests (including the Tower of London, Trail Making, and Wisconsin Card 
Sorting tasks) were normal.  The lesions are localized in the hippocampus with little if any 
parahippocampal cortex involvement; this was confirmed with structural MRI for two patients and CT for 
the third (2563, who has a pacemaker; Allen et al, 2006; Hannula et al, 2006).  To serve as control 
participants, we also tested four intact comparison participants (three men, one woman) matched 
individually to the patients by age, gender, and handedness (two comparisons were matched to the same 
patient).  The amnesic patients were tested at the University of Iowa Carver Hospital and compensated 
according to the University of Iowa Human Subjects Committee and Internal Review Board while the 
control participants were tested at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and compensated $10 per 
hour of testing according to the University of Illinois HSC and IRB.  All participants provided informed 
consent before each testing session. 
2.3.2. Apparatus 
 Eye movement data were collected on an EyeLink 1000 (SR Research) eye tracker.  The eye 
tracker shines infrared light on the eye and calculates eye position by the location of the pupil and 
changes in the angle of light reflected back from the cornea.  Eye position data were collected at 1000 Hz 
while participants sat comfortably using a chin rest.  Point of gaze is determined by a calibration phase.  
A number of fixation crosses are presented at predetermined locations on the computer screen one at a 
time while participants are directed to look at the cross.  The eye tracker uses the observed eye position 
and the known fixation cross position to calculate point of gaze on experimental trials.  Point of gaze is 
measured with an average accuracy of .5 degrees of visual angle.   
The eye tracker reports the onset and offset times of fixations and blinks and sends them to a 
Windows-based computer.  Fixations are calculated on-line by the EyeLink software; fixations are 
defined as viewing left after blinks and saccades have been marked.  The software identifies blinks by 
pupil size or blockage and saccades by the acceleration and velocity of the eye position.  The final data 
provided by the eye tracker are a list of fixation positions and onset/offset times relative to the beginning 
of the trial.  These data were parsed using a MatLab script to attribute the fixations to one of three regions 
of interest (ROI), each being defined by the position of a face on the computer screen.  Fixations outside 
the ROIs were discarded.  Additionally, fixations of less than 82 milliseconds were discarded.  Fixation 
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durations to the ROIs were analyzed themselves as well as used to calculate other eye movement 
measures as described in the analysis section.    
Presentation software was used for stimulus display.  The initial session (described below) used 
Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2007.  Statistical analyses were carried out in R. 
2.3.3. Materials 
 The materials consisted of a pool of 204 male non-famous faces, 200 female non-famous faces, 
225 male famous faces, and 151 female famous faces (see also Althoff and Cohen, 1999; Ryan et al, 
2007).  The non-famous faces were collected from a variety of sources such as hairstyling magazines to 
ensure that the general attractiveness and quality of the photographs were similar to the pictures of the 
famous people.  360 non-famous faces were selected randomly from the pool for use in the experiment; 
72 famous faces were selected as described in the next section.  The faces were presented in color at a 
size of 470 by 475 pixels with a screen resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. 
2.3.4. Task and Design 
 Each participant underwent three testing sessions: an initial session to establish their knowledge 
of famous people and two experimental sessions.  In the initial session participants saw all famous faces 
from the pool intermixed with 40 non-famous faces; faces were presented one at a time for participants to 
identify by name if possible or to describe in general otherwise.  The non-famous faces were included so 
that participants would not feel that they should find every person famous.  The high threshold of naming 
was used to ensure that the famous faces were indeed famous and strongly familiar.  Participants’ ability 
to identify the famous faces was used to determine what famous faces they would see in the later 
experimental sessions.  One patient (1846) did not identify a sufficient number of famous faces by name, 
so additional faces were used so long as the patient remembered other details (such as if the person were 
an actor or what show she was on) or described the face as familiar.  These additional faces were 
concentrated in their own blocks (see procedure section) to allow for separate analysis.  However, 
performance was similar and so the blocks for all participants were combined in the analyses presented 
below. 
In the experimental sessions participants studied a mix of nine famous and nine non-famous 
faces.  These 18 faces were then presented again in a new randomized order, and this was repeated so that 
each face was seen five times.  Study trials were presented for five seconds separated by one second of 
fixation.  The study block was followed by a test block consisting of 36 trials.  Each trial involved 
presenting three faces.  Nine trials were ‘catch’ trials, consisting of three non-studied, non-famous faces.  
Nine were ‘studied famous’ trials, consisting of two non-studied, non-famous faces and one studied 
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famous face.  Nine were ‘studied non-famous’ trials, consisting of two non-studied, non-famous faces and 
one studied non-famous face.  Finally, nine trials were ‘non-studied famous’ trials, consisting of two non-
studied, non-famous faces and one non-studied famous face.  Test trials lasted for 7.5 seconds and were 
separated by 1.5 seconds of fixation.  Two study and tests blocks were completed in a session so in total 
there were 18 test trials of each type (studied famous, studied non-famous, non-studied famous, and 
catch) under each instruction (novelty and familiarity) for each participant.  Examples of study and test 
displays are presented in figures 2.1 and 2.2.   
 
Figure 2.1.  Sample study trials.  Faces were displayed for five seconds and followed by one second of 
fixation.  The examples are non-famous faces. 
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Figure 2.2.  Sample test trials.  Test trials lasted 7.5 seconds and were separated by 1.5 seconds of 
fixation.  The examples are studied non-famous trials where the targets are the faces from figure 1 (top 
right face and then top left face). 
Due to the small number of participants, no attempt was made to counterbalance the stimuli.  
Instead an experiment frame was created that assigned a role to each trial number; for example, study trial 
one was famous face number eight, study trial two was non-famous face number five, etc.  Test trial one 
was a studied non-famous trial using non-famous face number two, and so on.  Each participant then 
received the same order of trial types, which controls for any potential trial type order effects.  The 
position of the familiar face on test trials was counterbalanced for each face type so that each of the three 
positions contained a familiar face equally often.  Non-famous faces, whether seen at study or only at test, 
were constant across participants and always seen on the same trial number.  Famous faces were 
randomly assigned to slots for each participant (e.g. famous face eight might be Demi Moore for one 
participant and Julia Roberts for another).  When possible, the same famous faces were seen by all 
participants; 22 faces were used for all seven participants, 20 were used for six, and 28 were used for five.  
The same experiment frame was used to create each block for every participant.  
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Non-famous, non-studied faces seen on test trials were matched to the familiar face on gender.  
When possible, equal numbers of male and female faces were used throughout the experiment; however, 
two participants did not recognize enough female famous faces and thus saw more famous male faces. 
2.3.5. Procedure 
 For the initial session, participants were seated in front of a laptop and received verbal 
instructions from the experimenter.  They were told that they would see a series of faces one at a time and 
were to report (either verbally to the experimenter or by typing on the computer) the name of each person 
if possible, or what they knew about that person (if they were familiar, what their job was, or other 
details).  They were also told that some non-famous faces were included so they should not expect to 
recognize every face.  Participants had as much time as they wanted to respond to each face. 
 Several weeks to a month later, participants were tested in the experimental sessions.  The 
experimental sessions were generally similar to experiments 2 and 3 in Ryan et al (2007).  Each 
participants’ first session used novelty instructions while the second experimental session was run under 
familiarity instructions.  Sessions were separated by one to four weeks to avoid any potential 
contamination or confusion due to the different instructions, with the exception of one delay reaching two 
months and one delay being only a day due to patient availability.  Participants went through two blocks 
in each session, with each block consisting of a study and test phase.  The study phase consisted of nine 
famous and nine non-famous faces seen five times each for a total of 90 trials.  Participants were asked to 
press the ‘m’ button on a computer keyboard if the face was male and the ‘f’ button if the face was 
female.  Faces were presented for five seconds regardless of the participants’ response; participants were 
asked to pay attention to the face for as long as it was on the screen.  The gender judgment was used as an 
incidental task to ensure attention was given to the faces; responses were not actually recorded.  Faces 
were separated by a fixation screen.  Participants were not told that they would have their memory for 
these faces tested, although they may have expected it (particularly in the second block).   
 After the study phase, participants were given verbal instructions for the test phase.  They were 
told that their eye movements would be collected during the test.  On each trial, participants would see 
three faces.  Under novelty instructions, participants were told that at least two of the three faces would be 
new, or novel faces that they had never seen before.  No button response was needed, but participants 
were to find a novel face and look at it for as long as it was on the screen.  No mention was made of 
famous or familiar faces; participants were encouraged to find a face that had never been seen before.  
Under familiarity instructions, participants were told that one face of the three would be familiar.  It could 
be familiar either by being famous or by being a face they had just seen in the study phase.  They were 
told to find the familiar face and look at it as long as it was on the screen.  Participants were not told about 
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the catch trials (on which no face was familiar), but were told that if none of the faces seemed familiar 
they should still pick one face and look at it.  After receiving instructions participants were asked if they 
had any questions, then settled into the chin rest.  They were calibrated so that the eye tracker could 
determine their point of gaze (see apparatus section), then the test trials were presented.  After the test 
block participants were told that the sequence would be repeated and they went through another study and 
test block under the same instructions. 
2.4. Analysis and Results 
 The data from one familiarity block was lost from two comparison participants due to computer 
error and the data from one novelty block was lost from a third comparison participant due to an inability 
to track the participant’s eyes because of her contact lenses.  All statistical analyses were run with a 
significance threshold of alpha=.05; if an effect is described as significant but no p value is provided, the 
p is less than .00001. 
 Because no behavioral responses were required, all data analyses were conducted on the eye 
movement data collected during the viewing of test displays.  These data take on two basic types: fixation 
durations and proportions of viewing time (see also Hannula et al., 2010).  Fixation durations, as the name 
suggests, are the length of individual fixations to the display.  The total viewing time for a test trial is the 
sum of the fixation durations on that trial.  The proportion of viewing time is calculated for a given ROI 
(in this experiment, a face) on a given test trial by dividing the sum of the fixation durations to that ROI 
by the total viewing time on that trial.  For example, if a participant fixated the three faces on one trial for 
a total of 5 seconds, and the fixation durations to a famous face on that trial summed to 2.5 seconds, the 
proportion of viewing time for the famous face on that trial would be .5.  Proportion of viewing time can 
also be calculated for subsets of a trial by binning the data (e.g. Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, & Cohen, 2007; 
Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 2007).  In the current experiment, bins were set to a size of 500 milliseconds, 
creating 15 bins per test trial.  Seven trials were removed due to no fixations being recorded on those 
trials.   
Fixation Durations: The data were analyzed following Ryan et al (2007).  First the data set was 
partitioned by orientation (novelty or familiarity) and by face type (studied and famous, non-studied but 
famous, or studied but non-famous).  Fixation durations were log-transformed to attempt to account for 
the large positive skew in the distribution.  Ryan et al (2007) found memory effects even on the first few 
fixations to a face; we limited analysis to only the first fixation because some faces only received a single 
fixation during a trial.  The mean first fixation durations for comparison and patient participants are below 
in figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
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Figure 2.3. Mean first fixation duration to different familiar face types under novelty instructions for 
comparison and patient participants. 
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Figure 2.4. Mean first fixation duration to different familiar face types under familiarity instructions for 
comparison and patient participants. 
The log-transformed fixation durations were analyzed with a regression model using group 
(patient or comparison), face type (non-studied famous, studied famous, or studied non-famous), and 
orientation (novelty or familiarity) as predictors.  The three-way interaction was not significant so it was 
removed from the model.  A significant two-way interaction (p=.044) was found between face type and 
orientation such that studied famous faces evoked shorter fixations than unexpected famous faces but only 
under novelty instructions; no other significant effects were found.  This analysis included the novel lure 
faces (not shown in the figure); while non-significant, both groups demonstrated numerically longer first 
fixations to familiar faces under familiarity instructions and roughly equivalent fixation durations to 
familiar and novel faces under novelty instructions.  The only exceptions were the unstudied famous 
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faces, which evoked longer fixations than novel faces under novelty instructions.  Critically, there was no 
main effect or interaction due to group, indicating that at least on the first fixation to any given face 
hippocampal damage had no influence on viewing.  To allay concerns that the lack of significant results 
was due to low power, the analysis was run again on both first and second fixations.  The results did not 
change. 
Following Ryan et al (2007), fixation durations were also partitioned into time bins throughout 
the trial.  For example, the 0-500 millisecond bin contains the average fixation duration for fixations that 
happen in the first half second after stimulus onset.  This allows for analysis of the changes in viewing 
patterns throughout the course of a trial.  These data were analyzed as above, using the log-transformed 
durations in a regression model, but bin number was added as an additional predictor variable.  The four 
and three-way interactions were not significant but, consistent with the analysis above, there was a 
significant two-way interaction such that in the novelty condition studied famous faces elicited shorter 
fixations than non-studied famous faces (p=.009).  A similar effect was found for the studied non-famous 
faces, but only at a trend level (p=.09).   
 The trend interaction suggested that in the novelty condition, both groups had longer fixation 
durations over the course of a trial to the unexpectedly familiar (non-studied) famous faces than the 
studied face types.  This may be an analogous effect to the one found by Ryan et al (2007) such that the 
unexpected familiar faces grabbed attention more than the studied familiar faces.  However there was no 
effect of hippocampal damage, and in the current work the effect occurred throughout the trial whereas 
Ryan et al (2007) found that the non-studied famous faces were eventually rejected and received less 
viewing later in the trial. 
Proportion of viewing:  Initial analyses were carried out on proportion of viewing calculated over the full 
length of the trial.  The mean proportion of viewing time for both groups to different face types is 
presented in figures 2.5 and 2.6.  A generalized linear model was fit to the data predicting proportion of 
fixation from group, orientation, and face type.  All coefficients were strongly significant, so follow-up 
analyses were conducted to explore the results.  
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Figure 2.5. Proportion of viewing time over the whole trial separated by how a face was familiar and 
group under novelty instructions.  Note that with three faces being present on screen, random viewing 
would be .33. 
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Figure 2.6. Proportion of viewing time over the whole trial separated by how a face was familiar and 
group under familiarity instructions.  Note that with three faces being present on screen, random viewing 
would be .33. 
As can be seen by comparing figures 2.5 and 2.6, participants were readily able to look at the 
familiar faces under familiarity instructions but not look at them under novelty instructions.  However, 
non-studied famous faces evoked different amounts of viewing than studied famous or studied non-
famous faces: the significant three-way interaction suggests that these effects differed between the 
patients and comparison participants.  Similar regression models were fit to the data from the familiarity 
and novelty conditions separately to elucidate the results.  In the familiarity condition, the two-way 
interaction between group and face type was significant; comparison participants directed more viewing 
to the familiar face than patients and this effect was exaggerated for the unexpectedly familiar famous 
faces.  Conversely, the comparison participants were relatively worse at rejecting the unexpectedly 
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familiar famous faces; this effect was verified via a significant two-way interaction in the novelty 
condition data between group and face type. 
To produce a timecourse of viewing, each trial was divided into 500 millisecond bins as was done 
for the fixation duration data.  The proportion of viewing time was then calculated as above, but within 
each bin.  Notably, the timecourse data can be analyzed to determine when viewing of familiar faces 
deviates from the chance level of .33.  The timecourses corresponding to figures 2.5 and 2.6 are presented 
in figures 2.7 and 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.7.  Timecourse of proportion of viewing time under novelty instructions.  Note that chance 
viewing is .33 as indicated by the solid black line. 
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Figure 2.8.  Timecourse of proportion of viewing time under familiarity instructions.  Note that chance 
viewing is .33 as indicated by the solid black line. 
Consistent with what was found for the whole-trial analysis, there was a significant interaction 
between group, orientation, and face type; this effect was mediated by a four-way interaction with bin 
number.  The data were split into novelty and familiarity conditions as previously, and again the 
interaction between group, face type, and bin number was significant.  Under novelty instructions, the 
comparison participants drove their viewing of familiar faces closer to 0 than patients did.  However, this 
did not occur for the non-studied famous faces; the groups viewed these faces at approximately chance 
levels.  The converse was true under familiarity instructions; comparison participants viewed the familiar 
faces at near-ceiling levels, higher than the patients.  However, the non-studied famous faces did not 
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evoke as much viewing.  And in contrast to the novelty condition, comparison participants appeared to 
begin to correctly view the non-studied famous face more as the trial went on; the patients did not. 
To quantify those impressions, the patient and comparison participants’ proportion of viewing in 
each time bin was tested to determine when viewing went above (for familiarity trials) or below (for 
novelty trials) chance.  These proportions were tested with one-tail t-tests against a proportion of .33; due 
to the small sample size, they should be viewed with some caution.  In the familiarity condition, patient 
viewing was significantly above chance after 500 milliseconds (in the second time bin) for studied 
famous faces (p=.017), 1000 milliseconds for studied non-famous faces (p=.044), and after 500 
milliseconds for non-studied famous faces (p=.01).  However, the viewing of non-studied famous faces 
decreased to chance levels in the next time bin and as the trial went on remained at chance levels.  
Comparison participants showed the same general pattern with viewing rising above chance for studied 
famous faces after 500 milliseconds (p=.01), after 1000 milliseconds for studied non-famous faces 
(p=.015), and after 1000 milliseconds for non-studied famous faces (p=.045).  However, in contrast to the 
patients, viewing to non-studied famous faces remained numerically above chance and near trend levels 
of significance (unadjusted for multiple comparisons) for most of the remaining time bins.  The patterns 
under novelty instructions were similar.  Comparison participants directed lower than chance levels of 
viewing to studied non-famous faces after 1000 milliseconds (p=.0005) and studied famous faces after 
500 milliseconds (p=.018) while patients did so after 2000 milliseconds (p=.028) and 1500 milliseconds 
(p=.029) respectively.  However, both groups viewed the non-studied famous faces at chance levels 
throughout the length of the trial. 
In summary, no effect of group was found on the fixation duration to the different kinds of 
familiar faces.  The only significant effect of note, appearing in both the first fixation and timecourse 
analyses, was an interaction between orientation and face type.  Under familiarity instructions, 
unexpectedly familiar famous faces evoked numerically shorter fixations than the two studied face types.  
However, under novelty instructions, fixation durations to studied faces decreased while the fixations to 
non-studied famous faces became slightly longer.  The interaction with time bin was not significant, so 
this difference appears to have occurred throughout the trial, even in early viewing.  Additionally, the 
effect did not differ between patients and comparison participants.  It appears that the unexpectedly 
familiar faces provided a conundrum for the participants: under familiarity conditions they were 
unexpected or perhaps not familiar enough, evoking shorter fixations than the studied faces, but under 
novelty conditions they were familiar enough to evoke inappropriate viewing while the studied faces were 
rejected more thoroughly and thus evoked shorter fixations.  A similar pattern was found in the proportion 
of viewing time data; both patients and comparison participants had difficulty properly viewing or 
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rejecting the non-studied famous faces.  This effect was further complicated by the finding that the 
comparison participants appropriately raised their viewing of the non-studied famous faces above chance 
under familiarity instructions, but failed to ever reject these faces (i.e. view them at less than chance 
levels) under novelty instructions.  A clearer pattern that is not present in the fixation duration data was 
found for the studied faces: famous faces were more easily accepted and rejected than non-famous faces, 
and amnesic patients had more difficulty separating their viewing of familiar faces from the novel lure 
faces.  This preferential viewing happened quickly, in less than 1500 milliseconds for studied faces for 
both patients and comparison participants under both novelty and familiarity instructions (with one 
exception: studied non-famous faces fell below chance under novelty instructions for patients after 2000 
milliseconds).     
2.5. Discussion 
 The current experiment investigated the effects of hippocampal damage on novelty processing as 
a goal/retrieval orientation.  The paradigm followed that of previous work by Ryan et al. (2007), who 
used instructions to manipulate what participants would search for while looking at three-face displays.  
Two questions were of primary concern: what effect does hippocampal damage have on novelty 
processing within the goal domain, and do unstudied but famous faces evoke odd patterns of eye 
movements, as in Ryan et al. (2007)?   
Addressing the first question, we found no effect of hippocampal damage on retrieval orientation.  
Under both familiarity and novelty instructions, patients demonstrated eye movements similar to those of 
their comparison group.  Under familiarity instructions both groups properly viewed the familiar face, 
with the effect becoming more prominent over the course of the trial; under novelty instructions, both 
groups demonstrated the opposite.  The amnesic patients were less able to properly view or reject the 
familiar faces than the comparison group; while comparison participants viewed studied faces nearly 
100% of the time late in a familiarity trial and novel faces 100% late in a novelty trial, the patients tended 
to still direct some viewing to inappropriate faces under either instruction.  This is likely due to their 
memory impairment, an idea at least numerically supported by the difference in viewing for studied 
famous and studied non-famous faces.  The non-famous faces, which should have weaker representation 
in memory, were viewed less appropriately than the famous faces, which should have a stronger 
representation in memory; eye movements are known to scale with repetition (Hannula et al., 2010), and 
thus probably also with memory strength.  The full acceptance (or rejection) of studied faces by the 
comparison group is likely a sign that the five study trials were sufficient to drive memory of those faces 
to ceiling.   
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In regard to the second question, we confirmed the differential viewing of famous but unstudied 
faces found by Ryan et al. (2007).  However, our pattern of results was somewhat different.  Ryan et al. 
(2007) observed that participants directed longer fixation durations to unstudied famous faces early in a 
trial under novelty instructions but that this effect went away and reversed after several seconds, when 
participants correctly started to direct more viewing to the novel faces.  Under familiarity instructions, 
participants correctly viewed these faces early and throughout the trial.  In the current experiment, the 
comparison group did direct above-chance levels of viewing to unstudied famous faces but the effect was 
smaller than what was observed for the two classes of studied faces.  The amnesic patients also directed 
viewing to these faces early, but the effect then dropped off to chance levels throughout the rest of the 
trial.  Under novelty instructions, however, neither group ever viewed the unstudied famous faces 
differentially from chance; they were viewed roughly as much as the novel faces over the entire course of 
the trial and were never rejected.  It is unclear why the pattern of viewing differed from what was found 
by Ryan et al. (2007); there were small changes in the paradigm and analyses as well as a larger change in 
the participant sample.  However, both studies agree that unstudied famous faces evoke a far different 
pattern of viewing than either studied non-famous or studied famous faces.   
Ryan et al. (2007) proposed two reasons that the unstudied famous faces could elicit this odd 
pattern of viewing: it could be because the unstudied face has no exact match in memory, or because the 
face is so novel in the experimental context that it automatically captures viewing.  We believe that the 
second explanation is more likely; the unstudied famous faces are unexpected and thus participants are 
unsure of how to treat them.  It is important to note, however, that these faces are still famous (a fact 
verified by each participant having provided the name matching the face in the initial session of the 
study), and other famous faces are also presented equally often during the testing phase.  Thus the 
unstudied famous faces can only be unexpected if the participant has some expectation that familiar faces 
will come from the study phase, even though they are told to look at (or not look at) a face that is familiar 
for any reason.  This would imply that the differential viewing of the unstudied famous faces is a kind of 
contextual effect.  Alternatively, it is possible that participants set a high criterion for deciding a face is 
familiar due to the extensive viewing during study.  An unstudied famous face, while famous, could 
potentially be less familiar during the test phase than a non-famous face that was studied five times just 
prior to test.  These faces would then be more familiar than a completely novel face, yet fall below the 
threshold set for most familiar faces.  Further research is necessary to tease out exactly why the unstudied 
famous faces elicit different viewing than the studied faces, but the effect does appear to be real.  
Additionally, the effect does not appear to depend on the hippocampus. 
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In conclusion, hippocampal amnesics demonstrated no deficit in regards to novelty processing as 
a goal.  The patients appeared to perform the task in the same manner as the comparison group, although 
their viewing was not as strongly differentiated due to their memory deficit.  Even in the case of 
unexpectedly familiar stimuli, namely unstudied but famous faces, their viewing patterns were similar to 
those of intact control participants.  Thus hippocampal lesions had no effect on novelty processing due to 
memory strength (i.e. famous faces were viewed more appropriately than non-famous faces), expectations 
(the unstudied famous faces), or retrieval orientation.  Given extant theories of hippocampal function in 
regards to memory (e.g. Kumaran & Maguire, 2007), it is possible that the hippocampus isn’t involved in 
novelty processing at all, and instead only appears to do so because of its role in encoding and retrieval 
processes.  Further investigation and clarification of the representations and computations involved in 
novelty processing is necessary, however, before such a claim is made in such a long-standing body of 
research. 
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3. The Effects of Hippocampal Lesions on Retrieval Orientation and Working 
Memory 
3.1. Abstract 
 Novelty processing is described as a critical function for survival, and has often been connected 
to the hippocampus.  However, little research has examined novelty as a goal, and the experiments that 
have found mixed evidence that the hippocampus is important for supporting novelty processing in that 
domain.  The current experiment expanded on the literature by testing hippocampal damaged (amnesic) 
patients under both novelty and familiarity goals at both short and long delays.  Additionally, eye tracking 
data was collected to give a more complete view of performance.  We found that hippocampal damage 
had no impact on performance after a short delay, but did impair performance after a long delay.  
Critically, hippocampal damage had no influence on the novelty manipulation.   Additionally, the eye 
tracking data provides some evidence that even under novelty instructions, participants prefer to work 
from a familiarity goal.  These data are consistent with typical views of the hippocampus’ role in memory 
as opposed to novelty processing.   
3.2. Introduction 
 Novelty detection has been called an essential function for organisms to survive (Dudukovic, 
Preston, Archie, Glover, & Wagner, 2011; Knight & Nakada, 1998).  It is certainly necessary for 
exploratory behavior; in order to explore new environments or investigate changes within familiar 
locations, first an organism must determine that something is in fact novel.  Thus it is fitting that novelty 
detection and processing has been studied in a variety of paradigms and with a variety of techniques.  For 
example, novelty processing has been studied with event related potentials (ERPs) in the novelty oddball 
paradigm (e.g. Cycowicz & Friedman, 1999), behaviorally and with ERPs in the von Restorff paradigm 
(e.g., Karis, Fabiani, & Donchin, 1984; Kishiyama & Yonelinas, 2003), and behaviorally and with 
positron emission tomography/functional magnetic resonance imaging (PET/fMRI) in a familiarization 
paradigm (e.g., Tulving & Kroll, 1995; Tulving, Markowitsch, Craik, Habib, & Houle, 1996). 
 Interestingly, given the range of paradigms involved, many types of novelty processing have been 
tied to the hippocampus.  Knight (1996), for example, found that lesions to the medial temporal lobes 
(MTLs) focusing on the hippocampus reduced or eliminated the novelty P3 component.  Converging 
evidence was found by Yamaguchi, Hale, D’Esposito, & Knight (2004) during an fMRI version of the 
novelty oddball paradigm, observing hippocampal activity that matched up well with patterns predicted 
by the ERP literature.  Kishiyama, Yonelinas, & Lazzara (2004) found that hippocampal lesions 
eliminated the mnemonic benefit of novel materials in the von Restorff paradigm.  And Tulving et al 
(1996) found that the hippocampus is more active while participants saw lists composed mostly of novel, 
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previously unstudied words compared to lists composed mostly of familiar, previously studied words; 
similar comparisons by Kirchhoff, Wagner, Maril, & Stern (2000) and Stern et al. (1996) confirmed this 
finding.  In short, novelty is often found to produce more activity in the hippocampus than familiar or 
expected materials, and hippocampal damage often destroys novelty-based effects. 
 One arena in which novelty processing has received relatively less study is within the domain of 
goals.  Novelty is typically an incidental feature of stimuli as far as participants are concerned; novel 
stimuli are unexpected and unresponded-to in the novelty oddball paradigm and novel stimuli are to-be-
remembered just as all stimuli are in the von Restorff and familiarization paradigms.  What happens when 
participants intentionally search for novel materials?  Only a few experiments we are aware of have 
examined this question.  Monk et al. (2002) measured hippocampal activity with fMRI while participants 
performed both delay-match-to-sample (DMS) and delay-non-match-to-sample (DNMS) tasks.  Because 
the current experiment follows a similar design, the Monk et al (2002) study will be described in some 
detail.  Participants underwent trials consisting of four phases: encoding, delay, test, and the inter-trial 
interval.  During encoding an abstract stimulus was shown; each stimulus consisted of a square made up 
of four smaller, differently-colored squares with various abstract patterns contained within.  Participants 
were told to remember the stimulus and then did so across the delay period, which was a 15-second 
unfilled time gap.  In the test phase they were shown two stimuli, one that was the same as the encoded 
stimulus and one that was different.  In DMS blocks, participants were asked to chose the matching 
stimulus at test; in DNMS blocks, participants were asked to chose the novel stimulus.  Thus the trial 
layout and stimulus presentation were identical for the DMS and DNMS tasks, but in one case the 
participants’ goal is to find a familiar (studied) stimulus while in the other their goal is to find a novel 
stimulus.  Compared to a color-counting baseline task, the hippocampus was more active during the 
encoding phase under both DMS and DNMS instructions.  However, it was not significantly more active 
during the delay or testing periods.  Relevant to the current question, this suggests that novelty and 
familiarity goals may not be different (behavioral performance was also the same under both 
instructions), and moreover that the hippocampus may not be differentially involved in processing novelty 
as a goal. 
 Supporting the Monk et al (2002) null result, Dobbins & Wagner (2005) found that the 
hippocampus was equally active while participants made a novelty decision or one of two different source 
judgments in a long-term memory paradigm.  However, using a temporal recency judgment instead of 
source memory, Dudukovic & Wagner (2007) found that the hippocampus was more active when 
participants made novelty judgments.  While a one-in-three success rate for finding differential 
hippocampal activity is not particularly strong, Dobbins & Wagner (2005) noted two reasons that their 
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design may not be optimal for finding a difference.  First, analyses were conducted only on correct trials.  
If the hippocampus were sensitive to different retrieval goals, it may also be sensitive to retrieval success; 
analyzing only correct trials would reduce this potential difference.  Second, the forced-choice test trials 
mean that each test trial contains both novel and familiar stimuli, which may have evoked a similar 
response regardless of the test instruction.  The second reason applies to all three studies just discussed, 
but Monk et al (2002) did analyze all trials, not just those with correct responses.   
 In addition to these fMRI studies, we are aware of one experiment that has compared novelty and 
familiarity goals using a patient with hippocampal damage.  Freed & Corkin (1988) tested patient H.M.’s 
memory for pictures six months after they had initially been encoded.  H.M. received additional study 
time compared to his control group so that initial memory (after a 10 minute delay) would be at an 
equivalent level.  At this later test, H.M. was given standard yes-no recognition and two-alternative-
forced-choice (2-AFC) tests and performed worse than the controls.  However, H.M. was also given yes-
no recognition and 2-AFC tests with instructions to look for novel stimuli, and he performed as well as 
the control group.  Part of that is due to the control group performing numerically worse on the novelty 
versions of the tasks, but H.M. also performed numerically better on the novelty versions of the tasks.  
The authors claimed that H.M. may have developed a novelty preference as a result of his surgery. 
 The current experiment aimed to further investigate novelty processing in the goal domain and to 
examine the role that the hippocampus plays in supporting such judgments.  Following Monk et al (2002), 
Dobbins and Wagner (2005), and Dudukovic and Wagner (2007), forced-choice was used as the testing 
paradigm.  Following the experiments from the Wagner group, goal (novelty or familiarity) was 
manipulated at the trial level.  However, the current experiment expands on the literature by testing after 
both short and long delays as well as testing multiple patients with hippocampal damage.  It also uses eye 
tracking to supplement the behavioral data.  Following the majority of the novelty literature, it would be 
predicted that hippocampal damage should impair performance on novelty goal trials.   
3.3. Methods 
3.3.1. Participants 
The participants included three patients (two men, one woman) with amnesia.  They have been 
described in detail in several papers by ourselves and colleagues (patients 1846, 2363, and 2308; Konkel 
et al, 2008; Allen et al, 2006; see table 1.1).  In short, two have lesions limited largely to the hippocampus 
(1846 and 2363) subsequent to anoxia (2363 due to heart attack, 1846 due to allergic reaction) while the 
third (2308) has a much larger lesion due to herpes simplex encephalitis.  Memory impairments were 
confirmed with standardized tests such as the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS).  While performance on 
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the WMS was very impaired, performance on intelligence (such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale) 
and executive function tests (including the Tower of London, Trail Making, and Wisconsin Card Sorting 
tasks) were normal.  The lesions in the anoxic patients are localized in the hippocampus with little if any 
parahippocampal cortex involvement; this was confirmed with structural MRI (Allen et al, 2006).  Patient 
2308 has a larger lesion due to encephalitis; it includes the hippocampus and amygdala in the right 
hemisphere but is more widespread on the left and includes the entorhinal and perirhinal cortices (Konkel 
et al, 2008).  While 2308 has a lower WMS memory score, his performance on other standardized tests is 
similar to the two anoxic patients.   
To serve as control participants, we also tested four intact comparison participants (three men, 
one woman) matched individually to the patients by age, gender, and handedness (two comparisons were 
matched to the same patient).  The amnesic patients were tested at the University of Iowa Carver Hospital 
and compensated according to the University of Iowa Human Subjects Committee and Internal Review 
Board while the control participants were tested at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and 
compensated $10 per hour of testing according to the University of Illinois HSC and IRB.  All 
participants provided informed consent before the testing session. 
3.3.2. Apparatus 
 Eye movement data were collected on an EyeLink 1000 (SR Research) eye tracker.  The eye 
tracker shines infrared light on the eye and calculates eye position by the location of the pupil and 
changes in the angle of light reflected back from the cornea.  Eye position data were collected at 1000 Hz 
while participants sat comfortably using a chin rest.  Point of gaze is determined by a calibration phase.  
A number of fixation crosses are presented at predetermined locations on the computer screen one at a 
time while participants are directed to look at the cross.  The eye tracker uses the observed eye position 
and the known fixation cross position to calculate point of gaze on experimental trials.  Point of gaze is 
measured with an average accuracy of .5 degrees of visual angle.   
The eye tracker reports the onset and offset times of fixations and blinks and sends them to a 
Windows-based computer.  Fixations are calculated on-line by the EyeLink software; fixations are 
defined as viewing left after blinks and saccades have been marked.  The software identifies blinks by 
pupil size or blockage and saccades by the acceleration and velocity of the eye position.  The final data 
provided by the eye tracker are a list of fixation positions and onset/offset times relative to the beginning 
of the trial.  These data were parsed using a MatLab script to attribute the fixations to one of two regions 
of interest (ROI), each being defined by the position of an item on the computer screen.  Fixations outside 
the ROIs were discarded.  Additionally, fixations of less than 82 milliseconds were discarded.  Fixation 
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durations to the ROIs were analyzed themselves as well as used to calculate other eye movement 
measures as described in the analysis section.    
Presentation software was used for behavioral data collection and stimulus display.  Statistical 
analyses were carried out in R. 
3.3.3. Materials 
 The materials consisted of a pool of 503 computer-generated images (hereafter called ‘items’; 
Konkel et al 2008).  Examples of the items can be seen in figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.  All items are based on 
a rectangle but were created by changing the color, pattern, and texture of the rectangle as well as by 
adding or taking out various shapes.  480 items were randomly assigned to 160 triplets for use in the 
experiment proper and an additional 21 were randomly assigned into triplets for use in the practice phase.  
The items were presented at a size of 305 x 300 pixels with a screen resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. 
3.3.4. Task and Design 
 The paradigm consisted of a series of short delay or working memory (WM) trials followed by 
long delay or long-term memory (LTM) test trials; the study phases for the LTM trials were intermixed 
with the WM trials.  Within each triplet two items were assigned to be studied and one to be presented as 
a new item at test.  Four types of trials were used: WM with a familiarity instruction (a DMS task), WM 
with a novelty instruction (a DNMS task), LTM with a familiarity instruction, and LTM with a novelty 
instruction.  WM trials required the maintenance of two items for three seconds with no intervening 
stimuli or task whereas LTM trials required remembering the items for at least 10 minutes while 
performing the WM task on intervening items.  Examples of the trial types are presented in figures 3.1 
through 3.3. 
41 
 
 
Figure 3.1.  A working memory trial with familiarity instruction (WMF; analogous to the DMS 
paradigm).  The correct response would be to press the left button.  Displays are presented for 2, 3, 3, and 
4 seconds, respectively. 
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Figure 3.2.  A long-term memory (LTM) study trial.  These trials are intermixed with the WM trials. 
Timing is the same as on WM trials (2, 3, 3, and 4 seconds for each display, respectively). 
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Figure 3.3.  A long-term memory test trial with novelty instruction (LTMN) corresponding to the study 
trial in figure 2.  The correct response would be to press the left button.  The timing is the same as the 
second half of a WM trial, or 3 and 4 seconds for the two displays, respectively. 
Participants completed 40 of each of the four trial types.  Each trial type began with an instruction 
to remember the following items presented for two seconds, followed by two study items presented for 
three seconds.  As an additional cue that the items were to-be-remembered, they were presented at the top 
and bottom of the computer screen (to contrast with test displays, described below).  On short delay trials, 
the study items were followed by a three second delay consisting of a fixation cross and an orientation 
instruction.  Familiarity trials had an instruction to ‘pick the old item’, referring to an item that had just 
been studied, consistent with the DMS paradigm.  Novelty trials had an instruction to ‘pick the new item’, 
referring to an item that had never been studied, consistent with the DNMS paradigm.  The delay period 
was followed by the test display, which consisted of one of the two study items and one novel item; the 
items were presented on the left and right sides of the screen for four seconds.  Participants chose an item 
by clicking the left or right mouse button to correspond to the item on the left or right side of the screen.  
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LTM study trials differed from WM trials in that the instruction screen contained only a fixation cross and 
the test display was simply a blank screen; however, the same timing was used.  After 160 trials (40 of 
each of the 4 trial types), participants received the tests for the LTM trials.  The tests consisted of 
instruction and test displays identical to the working memory trials; a familiarity or novelty instruction 
was presented with a fixation cross for three seconds followed by a four second test display. 
Due to the small number of participants, no attempt was made to counterbalance the stimuli.  
Instead one experiment order was created and each participant went through that order; thus each 
participant was subject to any potential item or trial order effects.  Either the top or bottom study item 
could appear at test, and this item could be placed on the left or right side of the test display; these two 
variables were counterbalanced with the four trial types such that there were equal numbers of trials in 
each of the 16 (4 x 2 x 2) conditions.  Trial order was randomized with the constraint that no more than 
three of the same trial type could be presented in a row.   
3.3.5. Procedure 
 Participants were given a verbal description of the task in general and then led through a practice 
phase by the experimenter.  Participants were shown the study instruction screen and a study display and 
told that the two items were to be remembered and that the instruction screen and the items presented on 
the top and bottom of the screen were markers of the study portion of a trial.  They were told that items 
should be remembered for both the short and long term since they would not know if a test would come 
immediately afterward or later in the experiment.  Next they were shown the delay phase with a 
familiarity orientation instruction and told that the instruction would tell them which item to choose, in 
this case referring to one of the two items just studied.  Next they were shown a test display and told that 
test displays would always present items on the left and right sides of the screen.  The participant was 
asked to press the left button if the ‘old’ item was on the left side or the right button if the old item was on 
the right.  The experiment was paused on each screen while the experiment was described and the 
participants asked questions if they had any.  Participants were then walked through a novelty working 
memory trial, noting the different instruction.  They were then shown a long-term memory trial.  They 
were told that seeing only a fixation cross without an instruction was a sign that they would be tested on 
those items later.  Participants then completed three WM and one LTM trials at experiment speed for 
practice.  Participants were encouraged to make their behavioral response while the test display was on-
screen, although responses were recorded after the trial had moved on. 
 After the practice phase participants were asked if they had any questions, then settled into the 
chin rest.  The eye tracker was calibrated so that it could determine the participant’s point of gaze (see 
apparatus section) and the participant was told that the calibration screen would occur periodically 
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throughout the experiment to check the eye tracker as well as offer the opportunity for a break.  The 
calibration screen was presented every 20 trials; participants were recalibrated if the experimenter felt it 
necessary.  If the participant asked for a break or leaned back from the chin rest the eye tracker was 
always recalibrated.  After 160 trials (80 WM and 80 LTM study trials) participants were told that the 
remaining trials would be only the tests for the items that had not been tested.  The 80 LTM instruction 
and test displays were presented, again with breaks for calibration every 20 trials.   
3.4. Analysis and Results 
 All statistical tests were considered significant with an alpha of .05.  Unless otherwise stated, all p 
values come from the likelihood ratio test comparing a model including the effect being tested to a model 
that does not include that effect (e.g., if a three-way interaction is significant the p value comes from 
comparing the model with that three-way interaction to a model with all two-way interactions and main 
effects but not the three-way interaction).  If a test is described as non-significant but no p-value is listed, 
p was at least .10.   
Behavioral data.  As mentioned previously, responses were still recorded if the button was pressed after 
the test display offset.  Output files were checked by hand for such responses.  If no response was made 
on a particular trial but a response was made within the first three seconds of the subsequent trial (during 
the study instruction display), the response was taken to be a late response.  All late responses were given 
a response time of 4 seconds, corresponding to the length of the test display.  This occurred on 64 trials 
(out of 1120 across the seven participants, or less than 6% of the time).  Participants could respond 
multiple times during a trial; their last response was taken as their intended response.  Trials with no 
response were removed from the behavioral analysis; this occurred for 36 trials (about 3% of trials).   
 Due to the request to make responses while the test display was on-screen, the distribution of 
response times was fairly normal and not improved by log-transform.  Statistical analysis on response 
times were thus carried out on the raw times.  The initial analysis was a mixed effects hierarchical linear 
regression using participant as a random effect and group (patient or comparison), test delay (LTM or 
WM), and retrieval orientation (familiarity or novelty) as fixed effects.  The three-way interaction was not 
significant so it was removed from the model; two significant two-way interactions were found 
suggesting that patients took longer to respond than the comparison participants on the WM trials relative 
to the LTM trials (p<.0001) and additionally that patients took longer under novelty instructions relative 
to familiarity instructions (p<.005) than did comparison participants.  The mean response times for each 
group on the four trial types are presented in table 3.1.  As can be seen in the table, comparison 
participants took the same amount of time regardless of instruction (albeit longer on LTM than WM trials, 
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p<.0001).  Patients, on the other hand, took roughly the same amount of time regardless of test delay (thus 
leading to the test delay interaction) but were slower to respond under novelty instructions (leading to the 
orientation interaction).  These effects can also be seen in figure 3.4. 
Trial Type WMF WMN LTMF LTMN 
patient 2353 2709 2598 2741 
comparison 2002 1970 2854 2788 
 
Table 3.1.  Mean response time on working (WM) and long term memory (LTM) trials under familiarity 
(F) and novelty instruction (N) for the patients and comparison participants.   
 
Figure 3.4.  Mean response time on working (WM) and long term memory (LTM) trials under familiarity 
(F) and novelty instruction (N) for the patients and comparison participants, illustrating the values in table 
1. 
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 Response accuracy was analyzed with a similar model but using a logistic generalized linear 
regression.  While the response times were normally distributed, correct responses are binomially 
distributed at the trial level (can only take the values 0 or 1).  The mean percent correct for each group in 
each condition is presented in table 3.2 and shown in figure 3.5.  
Trial Type WMF WMN LTMF LTMN 
patient 82.9% 59.8% 54.9% 47.4% 
comparison 82.3% 85.3% 67.5% 65.7% 
 
Table 3.2. Mean percent correct on WM and LTM trials under familiarity and novelty instruction for the 
patient and comparison participants. 
 
Figure 3.5. Mean percent correct on WM and LTM trials under familiarity and novelty instruction for the 
patient and comparison participants, reporting the values seen in table 2. 
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 The model found a significant three-way interaction suggesting that patients performed worse on 
WM trials under novelty instructions.  This effect appears to be driven by one patient who performed far 
below chance (36.1%) on that trial type (the other two patients performed with 68.4 and 75% accuracy; 
see table 3.3).  If it is assumed that many of these responses were a failure to press the correct button, as 
opposed to failures of memory, then that data cell would be much closer to comparison performance.  In 
that case, both patients and comparison participants would perform worse on the LTM trials than the WM 
trials, and the patients would perform worse than comparison participants on LTM trials (p=.04).  These 
results would be expected given the traditional views of forgetting and amnesia.  However, a speed-
accuracy trade-off is possible since the patients responded more slowly than the comparison participants.  
Alternatively, the poor-performing patient also performed the worst on the other three trial types but at 
comparable levels to the other two patients (table 3.3); he did not consistently ignore the orientation 
instruction.  So it is possible that his performance was indeed at chance (although numerically below), 
but, as is further explained below, we believe that the poor performance is due to a failure to follow 
instructions and not poor memory.  
Trial Type: WMF WMN LTMF LTMN 
1846 84.6% 68.4% 56.4% 60% 
2363 76.9% 36.1% 50% 40% 
2308 87.2% 75% 58.3% 42.1% 
  
Table 3.3.  Mean percent correct for each amnesic patient on WM and LTM trials under novelty (N) and 
familiarity (F) instructions.  Note that patient 2363 is an outlier only on WMN trials. 
Eye data. Three kinds of eye data variables were analyzed: fixation durations, number of transitions, and 
proportion of viewing. (Hannula et al, 2011).   
The first analysis considered first fixations to an item on a test trial.  Many viewing effects are 
apparent very early, even on the first fixation (e.g. Ryan et al, 2007).  Fixation durations were strongly 
skewed, so analyses were conducted on the log transformed values.  A mixed effects hierarchical linear 
model treating participant and trial number as random effects and test delay (LTM or WM), orientation 
(familiarity or novelty), group (patient or comparison), and item fixated (the proper target or not) was fit 
to the data.  A significant three-way interaction (p=.02) between test type, orientation, and item fixated 
was found.  The data were separated by test delay and tested with similar models to investigate this effect.  
On WM trials, the only significant predictor of first fixation duration was item fixated; fixations to the 
correct item were longer than fixations to the incorrect item regardless of group or orientation.  In 
contrast, on LTM trials there was a trend (p=.1) for patients to spend more time fixating the correct item 
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under novelty instructions.  Disregarding that trend, there was a significant two-way interaction (p=.02) 
for the correct item to elicit longer fixations than the incorrect item under novelty instructions but not 
familiarity instructions.  To illustrate these effects difference scores were created by subtracting the 
average fixation duration to the incorrect item from the average fixation duration to the correct item for 
each participant.  This difference is presented for each group in each trial type in table 3.4.  In general, 
greater viewing to the correct item was larger for WM trials than LTM trials.  This may reflect the 
stronger representation for the items at short delay compared to long delay. 
Trial Type WMF WMN LTMF LTMN 
Patient 32 25 -14 61 
Comparison 65 22 5 10 
 
Table 3.4.  Mean difference in first fixation duration by group and trial type.  Positive values indicate that 
the correct item evoked longer fixations than the incorrect item. 
The number of transitions was examined next.  The number of transitions was defined as the 
number of times the item being fixated changed; if only one item was fixated on a trial, then zero 
transitions occurred.  Transitions were only counted before a response was made; before a response is 
made the participant is presumably extracting information from the display and comparing the items, but 
it is unclear what a participant is doing after a response is made.  Transitions were analyzed with a mixed 
effects hierarchical generalized linear model using the Poisson distribution to account for their status as a 
counting variable.  Participant was treated as a random effect while test type (LTM or WM), group 
(patient or comparison), orientation (novelty or familiarity) and accuracy (if the trial received the correct 
response or not) were treated as fixed effects.  There was a significant two-way interaction (p=.007) 
between test type and accuracy; participants made the same number of transitions on LTM trials 
regardless of accuracy whereas they made more transitions on incorrect WM trials.  This is likely an 
indication of uncertainty on WM trials; memory was generally good so more transitions could be a sign 
that the participant was uncertain and needed to compare the two items more.  Memory was weak on 
LTM trials and so the participant was relatively equally uncertain whether they were correct or not.  
Again, this effect did not differ depending on group or orientation. 
Finally, proportion of viewing time was examined.  The total viewing on a trial was defined as 
the total amount of time spent fixating the two items on-screen.  The proportion of viewing to a given 
item was defined as the total amount of time spent fixating that item divided by the total viewing time on 
that trial.  Proportion of viewing can also be calculated within time bins (e.g. Hannula et al, 2007) to 
produce a picture of how viewing changes over the course of a trial.  Each trial is divided up into 500 
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millisecond bins relative to the onset of the test display (i.e. 0 to 500 milliseconds, 500 to 1000 
milliseconds, etc.).  Fixations are assigned to bins, and any fixation that spans two bins is divided (e.g. a 
fixation from 400 to 600 milliseconds would add 100 milliseconds to the 0-500 bin and 100 milliseconds 
to the 500-1000 bin).  The data were analyzed with a mixed effects hierarchical generalized linear model 
using the binomial distribution since the data were proportions.  As before, participant and trial were 
treated as random effects while orientation, test type, group, and time bin were treated as fixed effects.  
The highest-order model did not converge, but visual inspection suggested that the groups may have 
responded differently and thus the data set was divided by group and analyzed separately.  The 
timecourses are shown for the patient and comparison groups in figures 3.6 and 3.7. 
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Figure 3.6.  The proportion of fixation to the correct item timecourse for patients separated by test type 
and orientation.  Circles represent familiarity orientation and triangles represent novelty orientation.  The 
horizontal line is set at .5 or chance viewing of the correct item. 
 There was a significant three-way interaction (p<.00001) for the patient group between time bin, 
test type, and orientation.  On LTM trials the correct item was not viewed above chance under either 
orientation except for the 2500 to 3000 millisecond time bin when studied items under familiarity 
instructions drew more viewing than new items under novelty instructions.  In contrast the correct item 
was viewed above chance quickly on WM trials, with studied targets rising above chance after 500 
milliseconds and novel targets after 1000 milliseconds.  The correct item was then viewed at above-
chance levels throughout the rest of the trial.  The comparison group (three-way interaction also 
significant, p<.00001) showed a similar pattern on LTM trials, with viewing rarely deviating from chance 
levels, as well as WM trials, with studied items receiving above-chance viewing in the second time bin 
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and novel items in the third.  The comparison group differed somewhat on WM trials in that viewing of 
the correct item dipped back closer to chance after the initial rise. 
 
Figure 3.7.  The proportion of fixation to the correct item timecourse for comparison participants 
separated by test type and orientation.  Circles represent familiarity orientation and triangles represent 
novelty orientation.  The horizontal line is set at .5 or chance viewing of the correct item. 
The response-locked timecourse for proportion of viewing was also analyzed (e.g. Hannula et al, 
2007).  While the timecourse analysis above provides a view of how quickly differences can arise after 
stimulus onset, they are complicated to interpret as a whole because of the influence of making a response 
(discussed in the transitions analysis).  In a response-locked analysis, the 0 time point is set at whenever a 
participant responded on a certain trial instead of stimulus onset and bins are defined relative to that point.  
If, for example, the participant responded after 2750 milliseconds on one trial, the -500 to 0 bin would 
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cover from 2250 to 2750 ms post-stimulus onset on that trial; if the response time on another trial was 
950, the same bin would cover from 450 to 950 ms.  Trials on which no response was made were 
discarded.  Some bins had few fixations and could not be reliably analyzed; for example, the earliest 
possible time bin could only be filled if the participant responded at the very end of the trial and fixated 
an item at the very beginning of a trial whereas the latest time bin could only be filled on trials where a 
response occurred very early but an item was still fixated at the end of the test phase.  Therefore to enable 
more reliable analysis and give a tighter picture of how participants responded, only fixations from -2000 
to 1000 (two seconds before response to one second after response) were included.   
The timecourses for the patient and comparison groups can be seen in figures 3.8 and 3.9.  The 
four-way interaction between group, time bin, test type, and orientation was significant.  Supporting the 
results from the initial LTM timecourse analysis, viewing of the correct item stayed near chance levels for 
the patients throughout the response-locked timecourse.  Viewing did appear to rise numerically above 
chance for novel items under novelty instructions within the second before response, but it returned to 
chance just after the response was made.  In contrast, viewing to both novel and familiar targets rose 
above chance 1500 milliseconds before the response was made on WM trials.  For the comparison group, 
viewing of the novel items rose above chance in the half second before a response was made on LTM 
trials but viewing of studied targets remained at chance throughout.  The reverse seemed to be true on 
WM trials as viewing rose above chance 1500 milliseconds before the response for studied targets but 
stayed at chance for novel targets until 500 milliseconds before the response. 
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Figure 3.8.  The proportion of fixation to the correct item response-locked timecourse for patients 
separated by test type and orientation.  Circles represent familiarity orientation and triangles represent 
novelty orientation.  The horizontal line is set at .5 or chance viewing of the correct item. 
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Figure 3.9.  The proportion of fixation to the correct item response-locked timecourse for comparison 
participants separated by test type and orientation.  Circles represent familiarity orientation and triangles 
represent novelty orientation.  The horizontal line is set at .5 or chance viewing of the correct item. 
Given the large amount of data and analyses presented, a summary is appropriate.  Behaviorally, 
the amnesic patients performed with the same accuracy as the comparison group on short delay (WM) 
trials but worse on long delay (LTM) trials; neither group demonstrated an effect of retrieval orientation 
(novelty or familiarity instruction).  The comparison group provided consistent response time data, taking 
longer on long delay trials.  Patients, on the other hand, took relatively longer on short delay trials and 
under novelty instructions (regardless of delay).  This suggests that perhaps there was some manner of 
speed-accuracy trade-off that allowed the patients to perform well at short delays and under novelty 
instructions.   
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Analysis of first fixations (table 3.4) showed that both groups knew what the target was even on 
their first view of the item; novel items elicited longer fixations under novelty instructions while studied 
items elicited longer fixations under familiarity instructions.  This effect was stronger on short delay trials 
when the memory trace may have been stronger.  Additionally, the correct item elicited longer first 
fixations under novelty instructions than familiarity instructions on long delay trials; this effect appeared 
to be driven by the patient group.  This may be evidence that as memory for the studied items fades, it is 
easier to search for a completely novel item than to look for what has been seen before.   
The transitions data generally confirmed the behavioral results.  Before a response was made, an 
equal number of transitions were made on correct and incorrect long delay trials, whereas fewer 
transitions were made on correct short delay trials.  This suggests that participants were able to find the 
correct item quickly when memory was strong but had difficulty and needed to make more comparisons 
when memory was weak.  Notably this effect did not differ by group or retrieval orientation.   
Proportion of viewing time was analyzed with timecourses created relative to both stimulus onset 
and response.  Neither group demonstrated much preferential viewing of the correct item on long delay 
trials, but both groups quickly viewed the correct item on short delay trials with a tendency for studied 
targets to evoke above-chance viewing more quickly than novel targets.  The response-locked analysis 
confirmed these results, with viewing on long delay trials rarely rising above chance even at the time of 
response but rising above chance before the response on short delay trials. 
3.5. Discussion 
 This experiment examined whether participants act differently when their goal is to search for 
novelty as opposed to when they are searching for familiar stimuli.  Further, we tested patients with 
damage to the hippocampus because the previous literature has commonly found the hippocampus to be 
important to novelty processing.  The results touch on a number of issues in the novelty and hippocampus 
literatures, which will be discussed in turn. 
Novelty as a goal: As discussed in the introduction, novelty processing is seen as a critical ability.  
However, little research has focused on people’s ability to actually exert control over novelty processing, 
i.e. by treating it as a goal.  The current experiment found evidence that when asked to search for novelty, 
participants may in fact still search for familiar stimuli and use that to make their decision.  On short 
delay trials, eye tracking data showed that familiar stimuli attracted more fixations when participants were 
looking for old items than novel stimuli attracted when participants were looking for new items.  This 
difference occurred early, as much as a second and a half before a response was made.  Only closer to 
response time did novel targets begin to gather more fixations.  Supporting evidence for this claim was 
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found in the transition data; if participants were inherently searching for the familiar item regardless of 
instruction, then more transitions should occur if they happened to initially fixate the novel item, since 
they would then want to transition to the familiar item to confirm their memory.  This prediction was 
confirmed numerically although not statistically (p=.11); participants made more transitions when they 
initially fixated the novel item, regardless of instruction, than when they initially fixated the familiar item.  
If people prefer to search for novelty by finding a familiar object, it casts some doubt on the claim that 
novelty processing is a critical, inherent ability of organisms.  Instead, perhaps an automatic memory 
judgment is made, focused on the familiarity of the object, and this provides the basis for novelty-related 
phenomena in the literature. 
The function of the hippocampus: Despite the strong connection between the hippocampus and novelty, 
novelty processing is rarely listed as a putative function of the hippocampus.  Instead, the hippocampus is 
often described as supporting relational memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum & Cohen, 
2001).  Relational memory is memory for the associations between arbitrary elements of the environment, 
such as the spatial location that an item occupies or which two words were studied together in a word pair 
experiment.  Importantly, in many cases the hippocampal connection with novelty has been found under 
conditions in which one would expect relational memory to be important (Kumaran & Maguire, 2006, 
2007; Köhler et al., 2005).  It has even been suggested that the hippocampal novelty response in fMRI 
could be used as a kind of adaptation signal to help further delineate the exact processes supported by the 
hippocampus (Kumaran & Maguire, 2009).  This perspective raises an interesting parallel between 
novelty processing in the hippocampus and priming responses found in other brain regions.  For example, 
reduced fMRI activity for repeated stimuli of different types (e.g. different objects of the same type, the 
same object presented in a different size or a different viewpoint) has been used in an effort to map out 
the visual system (e.g. Grill-Spector et al., 1999).  But this neural response in the visual system is 
considered priming or adaptation, not a novelty response (Habib, 2001).  Kumaran and Maguire (2009) 
similarly argue that the commonly found novelty activation in the hippocampus may just be a similar sign 
of the actual kind of processing that the hippocampus supports.  This would not be novelty processing, 
but relational memory or some other memory-based function.   
 The current experiment supports this view in two ways.  First, hippocampal damage had no effect 
on performance under a novelty goal.  If the hippocampus supported novelty processing in some manner, 
one would have predicted that hippocampal damage would impair patients’ ability to search for novelty, 
but that was not the case.  There is a concern behaviorally that the patients performed worse than the 
comparison group on the novelty trials at short delay.  However, we argued that one patient drove that 
result and likely was not following directions, given how far below chance he performed.  Additionally, 
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that patient was faster to respond on incorrect trials in that condition than correct trials, reversing the 
pattern exhibited by each other patient as well as himself in other conditions.  Thus the patients performed 
similarly to the comparison group both behaviorally and in terms of their eye movements at short delay 
(this issue will be discussed further in the next section).  Second, the current experiment had no relational 
component, and thus would not be expected to have produced any deficit in performance under extant 
theories of hippocampal function.  Participants were required only to encode two independent items into 
memory and to remember them, separately, for a later test.  While the stimuli used in this experiment are 
broadly similar to each other, and amnesic patients have demonstrated impairment on similar materials 
(Duff et al., 2011; Holdstock et al., 2002), that was unlikely to be a concern here.  The two stimuli 
presented on any given trial could be readily identified and maintained over the delay by their primary 
color or pattern; the items in figure 3.1 could be remembered as ‘the neon one’ and ‘the purple one’, for 
example.  This strategy would work a large proportion of the time for the short delay trials, and only 
provide difficulties on the long delay trials when multiple purple items have been studied.  This is exactly 
the pattern of results found.    
The hippocampus at short delay: The hippocampus has long been viewed as supporting long-term 
memory, commonly based on evidence that amnesic patients could retain information only for a short 
period of time (e.g. Warrington & Baddeley, 1974).  However, the distinction between short and long-
term memory has been questioned as of late (Ranganath & Blumenfeld, 2005) and an increasing number 
of fMRI (Barense, Henson, & Graham, 2011; Gazzaley et al., 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2008; 
Oztekin, McElree, Staresina, & Davachi, 2009; Ranganath & D’Esposito, 2001; Voss, Galvan, & 
Gonsalves, 2011; Voss, Gonsalves, et al., 2011) and patient (Crane & Milner, 2005; Duff et al., 2011; 
Hannula, Tranel, & Cohen, 2006; Olson, Moore, et al., 2006; Olson, Page, et al., 2006; Voss, Galvan, et 
al., 2011; Voss, Gonsalves, et al., 2011; Warren, Duff, Jensen, et al., 2011; Warren et al., 2010; Warren, 
Duff, Tranel, et al., 2011) studies have found connections between the hippocampus and performance on 
short-delay and even no-delay tasks (see also Graham, Barense, & Lee, 2010).  These results have led to 
the idea that the hippocampus (and, indeed, any brain region) should be viewed in terms of its information 
processing abilities or the representations that it supports as opposed to in regards to time scale.  This 
viewpoint is bolstered by the finding that hippocampal involvement is typically found in short-delay tasks 
with a relational binding component (Crane & Milner, 2005; Hannula & Ranganath, 2008; Hannula, 
Baym, Warren, & Cohen, 2012; Hannula et al., 2006; Olson, Page, et al., 2006; Warren, Duff, Tranel, et 
al., 2011).  If the hippocampus is critical for supporting the representations that underlie relational 
binding, it would be necessary to support performance at any time scale so long as relational memory 
were important to the task.  That would be true of the long delay test in the current experiment, but not the 
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short delay test.  As discussed above, performance on the short delay test could easily be supported by 
verbal rehearsal across the delay.  However, as more items were seen and these labels became 
insufficient, the hippocampus would be needed to help support memory after a long delay.  At this point, 
the amnesic patients performed at chance while the comparison group performed above chance, albeit 
worse than after a short delay.   
Conclusions and future directions: In summary, the results of the current experiment fit well with the 
current view of hippocampal function as it relates to pattern separation and relational binding.  They are 
less consistent with a strong view of novelty processing as an independent psychological function; 
instead, novelty processing may consist of a constellation of other processes, such as retrieval (as part of 
evaluating the novelty of a stimulus), goals (organisms may default to emphasizing novelty exploration if 
no other goal is pressing), attention (focus is aimed at novel stimuli over familiar stimuli), and encoding 
(novel stimuli need to be entered into memory) amongst others.  However, it is possible that a novelty 
difference could be found under other circumstances.  For example, Freed and Corkin (1988) found that 
amnesic patient H.M. was able to demonstrate normal memory for pictures six months after having 
studied them, provided that he was tested with novelty-focused recognition.  While the long delay in this 
experiment was much shorter (on the order of ten minutes), it is possible that the study time allowed was 
insufficient for these materials and thus the patients tested here simply could not perform above chance 
under any circumstances.  The plausibility of this claim is mitigated somewhat, however, by the fact that 
the patients performed equally well under novelty and familiarity-focused tests after a short delay but 
were not near ceiling; if a preference for one instruction over the other were present, it should have been 
noticeable in that condition but none was found.   
 Another possibility is that another brain region aside from the hippocampus supports novelty 
processing.  One contender from the literature is the prefrontal cortex (for review see Ranganath & 
Rainer, 2003).  Like the hippocampus, the prefrontal cortex has been implicated in a variety of novelty 
experiments; it is typically more active for novel than familiar stimuli (Kirchhoff et al., 2000; Tulving et 
al., 1996), prefrontal lesions reduce the novelty P3 ERP component (Knight, 1984; Lovstad et al., 2011), 
and prefrontal lesions reduce the von Restorff effect (Kishiyama, Yonelinas, & Knight, 2009).  Future 
research could examine the role of prefrontal lesions on novelty in the way that hippocampal lesions were 
tested here.  However, since much of the same evidence for the hippocampus applies to the prefrontal 
cortex, it is questionable what result should be expected. 
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4. The Effects of Novelty Processing on Recognition Memory 
4.1. Abstract 
 Novel stimuli are known to evoke different responses than familiar stimuli.  Unexpected stimuli, 
such as oddballs in the novelty oddball task, elicit an orienting response.  Similarly contextually odd 
items are also better remembered on later memory tests, as in the von Restorff paradigm.  However, there 
is little research on the mnemonic effects of searching for novel stimuli.  It is possible that a novelty 
orientation would benefit all items, treating them as if they were novel stimuli.  In contrast, we 
hypothesized that a novelty orientation would lead participants to limit the retrieval strategies they might 
otherwise use, leading to poorer memory.  We adapted the Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, & Rhodes (2005) 
memory for foils paradigm to investigate if participants search their memory differently under a novelty 
goal compared to typical recognition.  Using a between-subjects design, half of the participants completed 
the test under typical recognition instructions, replicating the Jacoby et al. (2005) effect.  The other half 
completed the second phase of the experiment, when retrieval constraint occurs, under novelty 
instructions.  The novelty group showed a reduced depth of processing effect compared to the 
‘familiarity’ group but was not significantly different in their memory for foils.  It appears that a novelty 
orientation does not impart the same benefits seen in other areas of novelty research, and may have some 
costs for memory.   
4.2. Introduction 
 Determining whether a particular element of the environment is novel or not is an important 
ability for survival; a novel creature, object, or location needs to be further investigated to determine if it 
is a threat, is useful, could provide shelter, etc.  Thus it makes intuitive sense that novel stimuli should 
evoke a response that leads to additional processing.  Research on novelty detection or novelty processing 
has thus proceeded in a number of different arenas, perhaps most commonly in the novelty oddball 
paradigm with event-related potentials (ERPs).   
 The novelty oddball paradigm (e.g. Knight, 1996)involves presenting participants with a stream 
of stimuli, typically auditory, and asking them to respond to a certain subset of those stimuli.  These are 
called targets and are presented infrequently; participants might be asked to press a button any time they 
hear a 2000 Hz pure tone, for example.  Participants are also told about ‘standard’ stimuli, which are 
presented frequently but require no response; an example might be a 1500 Hz tone.  However, a third 
class of stimuli are also presented during the experiment without the participant being informed 
beforehand; these ‘oddballs’ are typically very different from the targets and standards (e.g. 
environmental noises like car horns and dog barks) and also occur infrequently.  These oddball stimuli are 
novel due to their unexpectedness, infrequent occurrence, and inherent characteristics (i.e. being of a 
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different sort than the targets and standards).  They evoke a particular ERP component called the novelty 
P3 or P3a which responds just as one might predict an orienting response would.  For example, the 
response habituates after a few oddballs have been presented and become less unexpected (Knight, 1996; 
see Yamaguchi et al., 2004 for the fMRI equivalent), but habituation only occurs if the oddballs are 
unexpected; participants who know about them demonstrate a reduced novelty P3 response from the start 
(Cycowicz & Friedman, 1999). 
 This novelty response has additional cognitive benefits.  In the realm of memory, contextually 
novel stimuli are usually tested in the von Restorff paradigm (R. R. Hunt, 1995).  In this paradigm, some 
stimuli in a list are made contextually novel by being of a different class than the rest of the memoranda; 
words could be presented in a larger or smaller text size or a different font (e.g. Karis et al., 1984) or line 
drawings could be presented in a different color (Kishiyama & Yonelinas, 2003).  These novel stimuli 
stand out and are better remembered on a subsequent memory test.  A similar result was found by Tulving 
& Kroll (1995) using what might be called stimulus novelty (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; Nyberg, 2005; 
Ranganath & Rainer, 2003).  Participants were initially familiarized with one set of words by making 
repeated living/non-living judgments as well as taking an old-item only recognition test.  This was 
followed by a ‘critical phase’ in which half of the familiarized words were presented along with new 
words; participants were told to specifically remember this list for a later test.  On the final test 
participants saw familiarized and ‘novel’ words from the critical list along with non-critical familiarized 
words and completely novel lures; only words from the critical phase were to be endorsed.  Tulving and 
Kroll (1995) found that critical novel words were more often endorsed than critical familiarized words 
and novel lures were more often rejected than familiarized lures.  This was taken as evidence in support 
of the novelty/encoding hypothesis (see also Tulving et al., 1996), which states that novelty assessment is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for encoding.  In short, novel stimuli have a memory advantage, 
even when novelty is defined in different ways. 
 While there is a large literature on the mnemonic consequences of detecting a novel stimulus, 
there is much less research on the consequences of intentionally searching for novel stimuli; that is, 
having a novelty goal or orientation.  Given the importance of novelty detection in general, one might 
expect that searching for novelty is a distinct process or ability than searching for known or familiar 
materials.  If this is true, then one might predict that searching for novelty could lead to generally better 
memory than searching for familiarity (e.g., working under typical recognition instructions).  Support for 
this idea comes from a study by Dudukovic & Wagner (2007).  Participants first studied a list of words, 
then were presented with three-alternative forced choice test trials consisting of two studied and one novel 
word.  Before each test trial participants were cued to either choose the more recently studied word 
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(recency judgment trials) or to choose the unstudied word (novelty judgment trials).  Having found brain 
activity differences between the two test types with fMRI, Dudukovic and Wagner (2007) then conducted 
a follow-up behavioral study using the same paradigm but followed by a second recognition test.  This 
test contained novel words from recency and novelty judgment trials as well as completely novel lures; 
participants were asked to endorse any word seen earlier in the experiment.  Participants endorsed more 
novel words from novelty judgment trials than recency judgment trials, which the authors took as 
evidence that those novel words drew more attention and thus more encoding. 
 The current experiment aims to expand on the novelty literature by investigating 1) if a novelty 
orientation differs from a familiarity orientation, and 2) if so, what the mnemonic consequences of 
searching for novelty are.  To do so, we adapted the source constraint paradigm used by Jacoby et al. 
(2005, experiment 1).  That experiment consisted of three phases.  In the first phase, participants studied 
two lists of words under a depth of processing manipulation: one list was incidentally encoded while 
participants made a pleasantness judgment while a second was incidentally encoded while participants 
made a perceptual (vowel detection) judgment.  The second phase consisted of two recognition tests, one 
for each of the previously studied lists.  Critically, participants were told that all of the old words on a test 
came from a particular list, deeply processed words on one test and shallowly processed words on the 
other.  Jacoby et al (2005) believed this would allow participants to constrain their memory search to a 
particular source, and if so they would reinstantiate the processing from study.  In this case, if participants 
believed that words may have come from the pleasantness task list, they would perform deep processing 
at test (and similarly for the shallow list test).  To test this, the third phase consisted of a recognition test 
for lures; participants saw lures from the deep and shallow tests in phase two as well as completely novel 
lures and were asked to endorse any word seen earlier in the experiment.  Consistent with their prediction, 
participants endorsed more deep test lures than shallow test lures (called the memory for foils effect), 
suggesting that a depth of processing effect occurred at test due to source-constrained retrieval and thus 
reinstatement of encoding processes even on novel lures.   
 In order to test the potential differences between novelty and familiarity processing, we used the 
same paradigm but added a between-subjects manipulation during phase two.  One group of participants 
received typical recognition instructions (familiarity orientation) and thus replicated the Jacoby et al 
(2005) paradigm.  The second group of participants was told to look for and respond positively to new 
words (novelty orientation).  If a novelty orientation leads to different retrieval strategies than a 
familiarity orientation, then participants in this condition should demonstrate differences in performance.  
We predicted that while participants in the familiarity group would engage in typical source-constrained 
retrieval, participants in the novelty group would perform a more low-level evaluation of test words.  
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More specifically, since they need only determine if a word is new, the novelty group would be less likely 
to constrain their memory search and may be less likely to engage in effortful retrieval processes like 
recollection (Yonelinas, 2002).  If this is true, the memory for foils effect should be reduced in the 
novelty orientation group compared to the familiarity orientation group.  
4.3. Methods 
4.3.1. Participants 
 Participants for experiment 1a were 82 undergraduates from the University of Illinois; there were 
93 participants in experiment 1b for a total of 175 participants.  Experiment 1b was run subsequent to 
experiment 1a, but no one participated in both experiments.  One participant in each experiment was 
removed for failure to follow instructions, leaving 173 for analysis.  Participants received either $8 or 
partial credit toward fulfillment of course requirements.  Testing was carried out under the guidelines of 
the University of Illinois Human Subjects Committee and Institutional Review Board. 
4.3.2. Materials 
 Separate lists of 5 and 6 letter words were collected from an online database 
(http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au/MRCDataBase/uwa_mrc.htm).  All words were nouns with a Kucera-Francis 
written frequency of at least 1 and a familiarity rating between 505 and 615; these values were chosen 
simply to control the number of words obtained (265 five letter words and 241 six letter words) while 
choosing words known by most people.  Both word lists were randomly divided into six lists of 40 words 
each and matched for frequency and familiarity; the remaining 26 words were removed from the word 
pool.  The five and six letter lists were then combined to form six lists of 80 words each containing 50% 
five letter and 50% six letter words.  These six lists did not differ significantly in terms of frequency or 
familiarity (p value for each ANOVA >.69).  The word lists were randomly assigned to conditions for 
each participant; presentation order within a condition was random as well. 
4.3.3. Task and Design 
 The experimental design follows Jacoby et al’s (2005a) experiment 1 but slightly changes the first 
phase and adds a between-subjects manipulation during the second phase.  Phase 1 was the study phase 
and began a depth of processing (DOP) manipulation.  All participants studied two lists of words (80 
words each) under incidental encoding conditions.  One list was presented with instructions to press one 
button (k) if the word was six letters long and another button (d) if the word was five letters long; this list 
will be referred to as the shallow list due to its role in the DOP framework.  The other list was presented 
with instructions to press one button (k) if the word was pleasant and another button (d) if the word was 
unpleasant.  This list will be referred to as the deep list.  The order of list presentation was 
counterbalanced across participants.  Participants had as much time as needed to respond. 
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 Phase 2 was the first test phase.  As in Jacoby et al (2005a) there were two separate tests.  In the 
deep test, participants were told that all old or familiar words were from the pleasant study list.  In the 
shallow test, they were told that all old words were from the letter length study list.  For each word, 
participants were to indicate if it was previously seen or not.  The order of test presentation was 
counterbalanced across participants.  Each test list consisted of the earlier presented list (deep or shallow) 
and an equivalent number of previously unseen lures for a total of 160 words on each test.  Orthogonal to 
study and test order, retrieval orientation was also manipulated and counterbalanced across participants.  
Half of the participants received typical recognition test instructions and thus served as a theoretical 
replication of Jacoby et al (2005a) experiment 1.  They pressed the right-side key (k) for old words and 
the left-side key (d) for new words to match with typical handedness.  The other half of the participants 
received novelty orientation instructions.  They were asked to look for new words that had not been seen 
before, and to indicate that a word was new by pressing the right-side key (k) or previously seen by 
pressing the left-side key (d).  Participants had two seconds to make a response; they were told their time 
was limited and that they should be quick yet accurate.  The time limitation was instituted to ensure that 
words were seen for equal amounts of time by the familiarity and the novelty retrieval orientation (RO) 
groups in the event that they differed on response time.  Even if one group responded faster than the other 
on average, words would be available for encoding for the same amount of time. 
 Phase 3 was the final test.  All participants performed the final test under typical recognition 
memory instructions, such that they pressed one button (k) to indicate that a word had been seen before 
and another button (d) to indicate that it was new.  The target words consisted of the 80 deep and 80 
shallow lures from phase two; that is, the words that should have been labeled ‘new’ on the deep and 
shallow tests.  An equal number (160) of lures were presented during the test.  Participants were told to 
consider any word seen anywhere earlier in the experiment as old and had as much time as needed to 
respond. 
 Experiments 1a and 1b were identical except for the final test phase.  Instead of making an 
old/new response, participants in experiment 1b made a one-step old/new and confidence judgment.  The 
rating scale ranged from 1 meaning “sure new” to 6 meaning “sure old”.  This change was made to allow 
for a more sensitive signal detection theory (SDT) analysis to be performed.  The participants in 
experiment 1b will be referred to as the rating group while the participants in 1a will be referred to as the 
ON (for ‘old/new’) group. 
4.3.4. Procedure 
 Participants were tested in groups of two to five but on individual computers in separate rooms.  
After obtaining informed consent, participants were directed to a room and told that the instructions for 
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the experiment would be presented on screen.  They were also told that the experimenter would answer 
any questions during the experiment.  Participants then paced themselves through the three phases of the 
experiment described above.  Breaks were only available between phases; participants had to wait a fixed 
amount of time to read instruction screens but were then able to press a button to begin a phase whenever 
he/she was ready.  Instructions were presented prior to each of the deep and shallow study lists, each of 
the deep and shallow test lists, and the final test.  A reminder of the task was always present at the top of 
the screen during each phase of the experiment; for example, participants in the novelty RO condition saw 
the phrase “Is it new?” during each test trial in phase two.  The response buttons (d and k) and their 
meaning (yes or no) were also presented on each test trial.  Words were always presented in the center of 
the screen in Arial size 60 font.  Trials in each phase of the experiment contained an inter-trial interval of 
500 milliseconds during which a blank screen was presented.  At the end of the experiment a screen 
informed participants that they had finished and they were then debriefed by the experimenter.     
4.4. Analysis and Results 
 Despite the similarity of the two experiments, all analyses were run with experiment (1a or 1b) as 
a factor to check if performance differed in the two groups of participants.  Response time data were 
collected, but due to the differences in response contingency across RO groups during phase two (right 
hand – new for novel and right hand – old for familiarity) they were not analyzed.  Most analyses were 
conducted via a mixed effects hierarchical regression model; unless otherwise described, all effects were 
tested via the Wald test and considered significant at alpha=.05.  Other statistical tests were also 
considered significant at alpha=.05.  Phases 2 and 3 were also analyzed with a second hierarchical 
generalized linear model.  This model converts responses to d’ measures (Macmillan and Creelman, 
2005) via the binomial distribution with a probit link function (the other analyses used the typical logistic 
link).  These models allow for trial-level information like word identity, frequency, familiarity, and length 
to be added as sources of variability.  The results of the d’ regressions were qualitatively similar to the 
logistic regressions, so only the logistic results are presented.  The data from phases 2 and 3 were also 
analyzed after hit rate and false alarm rate values for each participant were converted to d’ (MacMillan 
and Creelman, 2005), but again the results corresponded with the logistic regression analyses presented. 
Phase 1: While the pleasantness of a word is a subjective opinion, the length of a word can be objectively 
evaluated.  As such, accuracy on the shallow study portion of phase 1 was analyzed to ensure that 
participants were paying attention and able to follow instructions, and that the randomly assigned RO 
groups did not differ in this ability (note that RO had not yet appeared in the experiment, so it should not 
affect performance).  The novelty group had an average accuracy of 97.1% and the familiarity group had 
an average accuracy of 97.6% in identifying the number of letters in the presented word.  A mixed effects 
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logistic regression model was fit to the trial-by-trial accuracy data with the length, frequency, and 
familiarity rating of the word as covariates of no interest; retrieval orientation and group as fixed effects; 
and participant ID, word, and list as random effects.  As expected, neither retrieval orientation nor group 
had significant effects on accuracy nor did they interact (all p > .55). 
Phase 2:  A model similar to that used to analyze phase 1 was fit to accuracy data in phase 2 as an initial 
search for potential effects.  Across all participants, there were 2,277 trials (or 4.1% of trials) on which no 
response was given in the time allowed; these trials were removed from the analysis.  The three-way 
interaction between retrieval orientation (novelty or familiarity), group (rating or old/new) and test (deep 
or shallow) was not significant (p=.309), so it was removed from the model.  There were significant 
interactions between RO and test (p<.0001) as well as test and group (p<.0001).  To further 
investigate these effects, the data were split by group and the model run again with RO and test as effects 
of interest.  For the ON group, test and RO interacted significantly (p=.002) and there were significant 
main effects of RO (p=.008) and test (p<.0001).  These effects can be described as a significant depth of 
processing effect with the novelty RO group showing a reduced effect.  Proportion correct is plotted 
below (figure 4.1) and hit and false alarm rates are presented in table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. Proportion correct for the ON group under novelty and familiarity RO for the deep and 
shallow tests in phase 2. 
 Novelty Orientation Familiarity Orientation 
Deep test hit rate .834 .851 
Deep test false alarm rate .190 .133 
Shallow test hit rate .576 .496 
Shallow test false alarm rate .373 .263 
 
Table 4.1. Hit and false alarm rates for the ON group under novelty and familiarity RO for the deep and 
shallow tests in phase 2. 
The rating group demonstrated the same effects.  Their proportion correct (figure 4.2) and hit and 
false alarm rates (table 4.2) are presented below. 
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Figure 4.2. Proportion correct for the rating group under novelty and familiarity RO for the deep and 
shallow tests in phase 2. 
 
 Novelty Orientation Familiarity Orientation 
Deep test hit rate .824 .831 
Deep test false alarm rate .259 .162 
Shallow test hit rate .564 .541 
Shallow test false alarm rate .354 .304 
 
Table 4.2. Hit and false alarm rates for the rating group under novelty and familiarity RO for the deep and 
shallow tests in phase 2. 
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In both groups and both retrieval orientation conditions, the main effect of test (DOP effect) is 
apparent; words encoded in the shallow condition were less likely to be correctly recognized.  The main 
effect of retrieval orientation is due to generally better accuracy under typical recognition memory 
instructions (i.e. for participants in the familiarity condition).  The test-RO interaction is due to the DOP 
effect being larger for participants in the familiarity condition.  This interaction is shown more clearly in 
figure 4.3.  Each bar represents the DOP effect by subtracting performance on the shallow test from 
performance on the deep test.  Additionally, the DOP effect is larger for the ON group than the rating 
group.  
   
Figure 4.3. Depth of processing effect size for rating and ON groups under novelty and familiarity RO. 
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In summary, in phase 2 we found the expected DOP effect due to the study phase manipulation.  
In addition, we found that this effect significantly interacted with retrieval orientation; participants with 
the typical familiarity retrieval goal showed a larger DOP effect.  This difference was driven by 
performance on the deep test; participants in the familiarity and novelty orientation groups performed 
similarly on the shallow test (hits minus false alarms ~ .21)  but the familiarity group performed better on 
the deep test (hits minus false alarms = .692 versus .603 in the novelty group).  Finally, the size of the 
DOP effect was also larger for participants in the ON group than those in the rating group.  This final 
interaction was not expected since the final test response manipulation had not yet occurred; it would 
appear to be due to differences in the participant groups run at different times.  The lack of a three-way 
interaction suggests that the DOP-RO interaction did not differ for the two groups. 
Phase 3:  One participant in the ON group had three inappropriate (neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’) responses; these 
were removed from the analysis.  For the initial analysis of the final test phase, responses from the rating 
group were collapsed into ‘old’ (a response of 4, 5, or 6) and ‘new’ (1, 2, or 3) and combined with the ON 
group and a model similar to that from phase 2 was fit to the data.  The model contained word familiarity, 
frequency, and length as covariates and participant, word, and list as random effects as before; the fixed 
effects of interest were RO, group, and word role.  The possible word roles were novel lure (never seen 
before in the experiment and should be rejected), deep target (a lure seen on the phase 2 deep test), and 
shallow target (a lure seen on the phase 2 shallow test).  The main effect of interest is to replicate the 
Jacoby et al (2005a) memory for foils effect, which would appear as a main effect of word role, and to 
determine if the size of the effect varies with retrieval orientation, which would appear as a word role – 
RO interaction.  No significant interactions were found; when they were removed from the model the 
main effects of word role (p<.0001) and group (p=.047) were significant.  Lures from the deep test were 
correctly identified more often than shallow lures, replicating the memory for lures effect, and 
participants in the rating task were more accurate overall.  Critically, there was no significant effect of 
retrieval orientation on final test performance.  The memory for foils effect is shown in figure 4.4 for the 
four group-by-RO conditions. 
71 
 
 
Figure 4.4. The memory for foils effect for group (rating and ON) and RO (novelty and familiarity) 
conditions.  The effect is calculated as the difference in hit rate between deep targets and shallow targets, 
expressed as a percentage. 
As a final analysis of the final test data, only participants from the rating group were examined.  
As opposed to collapsing their ratings to give old/new responses, their confidence ratings were fit with a 
maximum likelihood estimation program (Diaz, personal communication) to an unequal-variance SDT 
model.  Unequal variances are typically found for the signal and noise distributions in recognition tasks 
(e.g. Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, & Adams, 1999), and a model of this type provides estimates of the multiple 
criteria points and da (d sub a, a measure of accuracy independent of response criteria; see Macmillan and 
Creelman, 2005) for each participant.  The program was fit to each participant separately for deep and 
shallow targets, again using novel lures as the common ‘noise’ distribution, and thus each participant 
provided two accuracy values.  The da values were analyzed with a linear mixed effects model as well as a 
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repeated measures ANOVA.  Confirming the results of the previous regression analysis, the linear 
regression found only a significant effect of target, which was also confirmed by the repeated measures 
ANOVA.  Thus the da analysis also shows that the memory for foils effect occurred, but did not differ 
with retrieval orientation. 
Summary: The three phases of the experiment were examined with a series of mixed effects regression 
models.  In phase 1, as expected, accuracy for determining the number of letters in a word did not differ 
for any of the groups or conditions manipulated later in the experiment.  In phase 2, as expected, a 
significant depth of processing effect was elicited by the study phase manipulation.  The effect was 
smaller for participants operating under novelty orientation instructions.  This finding suggests that the 
novelty retrieval orientation did have an effect on participants’ memory search.  It is possible that the task 
was simply strange or more difficult for participants, but the significant interaction suggests that accuracy 
did not decrease evenly but in fact differed on the deep and shallow tests.  Performance on the shallow 
test was above chance (two tailed t-test, p<.0001), so the interaction is not likely to be due to floor effects.  
Participants in the RO conditions did not differ during the study phase, so it is unlikely that the DOP 
difference is due to encoding effects.   
Instead, the difference appears to be driven by lowered performance on the deep test, suggesting 
that perhaps novelty participants failed to properly constrain their memory search to look for detailed 
information in the same way that familiarity participants did.  The two groups performed equivalently on 
the shallow test, presumably because memory judgments were made on the basis of a general familiarity 
or strength signal that was not affected by the retrieval instruction.  However, this difference did not carry 
forward into the final test.  In phase 3 a significant memory for foils effect was elicited but did not 
significantly differ with retrieval orientation.  Assuming the null result is accurate, it suggests that while 
the novelty RO group was less likely to constrain their memory search in phase 2, they were able to 
perform a normal memory search in phase 3 under typical recognition memory instructions.  Furthermore, 
their memory accuracy was not harmed despite the lowered overall performance and memory constraint 
during phase 2.   
4.5. Discussion 
 The current experiment had two aims: to attempt to determine if searching for novelty appears to 
be a distinct process from searching for familiarity (i.e. recognition), and if so to look for possible effects 
on memory due to a novelty orientation.  While a large amount of research has examined the effects of 
viewing a novel stimulus (such as different patterns of eye movements (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978) or 
better memory (R. R. Hunt, 1995)), much less is known about what happens when a person is attempting 
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to find novel stimuli.  One potential outcome is better encoding; according to Tulving and Kroll’s (1995) 
novelty/encoding hypothesis, novelty detection is a necessary condition for encoding.  If novelty is a 
feature or characteristic of stimuli that can be searched for, a novelty orientation could emphasize that 
information and thus lead to increased or better encoding of even somewhat familiar stimuli.  One might 
also predict that a novelty orientation is really just a familiarity orientation in masquerade; any particular 
stimulus is familiar to the extent that it isn’t novel and vice versa (Habib, 2001).  When asked to make a 
memory decision, whether it is aimed towards familiarity or aimed towards novelty, participants evaluate 
the memory content of the stimulus and then simply respond appropriately.  In that case, null effects 
would be predicted throughout the experiment.  Alternatively, we predicted that a novelty orientation 
would reduce memory performance due to a lowered reliance on recollection or source-constrained 
processing.  Because participants would be focused on a simple familiar/not-familiar decision, they would 
be less likely to constrain their memory search or engage in more thorough retrieval processes. 
 While we predicted that the novelty orientation group would show a reduced memory for foils 
effect, there was no support for this in the data.  There are a number of reasons this could have occurred.  
First, the second hypothesis from above could be correct and novelty orientation participants simply 
performed the exact same processes as the familiarity group, simply pressing a different button at the end 
of test trials.  However, the orientation effects found during phase two argue against that interpretation.  
Novelty orientation participants demonstrated a reduced depth of processing effect; we believe this to be 
due to a focus on a simple strength-based evaluation of each stimulus as opposed to a deeper search for 
associated information.  This hypothesis is supported by the observation that the reduced DOP effect 
comes from lower performance on the deep, but not the shallow, test.  A similar pattern of results was 
found for older adults in the original memory for foils paradigm (Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova, & Rhodes, 
2005), who also do not appear to constrain their memory search.  This reduced processing should cause 
the deep and shallow lures to be processed more similarly in the novelty group, leading to a reduced 
memory for foils effect.  However, this result was not confirmed.  One potential reason is that the 
orientation manipulation, while effective, was too subtle to carry through to the final test.  The depth of 
processing difference between groups was on the order of only a few percentage points, and while 
statistically significant may not have been large enough to carry over.  Another, not mutually exclusive 
reason could be due to extra encoding processes brought to bear on the lures by the novelty group.  An 
important difference brought on by the orientation manipulation is that the phase two lures were targets 
for the novelty group while they were simply lures for the familiarity group.  The previously-described 
experiment by Dudukovic and Wagner (2007) already found that novel lures appear to draw more 
attention and hence more encoding when they are retrieval targets than when participants are searching 
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for familiar targets.  These encoding processes may have served to mask any memory for foils differences 
between the orientation groups that would have otherwise been observed.   
 Returning to the goals of the experiment, the evidence is mixed.  We did demonstrate that a 
novelty orientation can evoke different processes than a familiarity orientation; the novelty group 
produced a reduced depth of processing effect during phase two of the experiment.  However, there did 
not appear to be later consequences for memory; the novelty group produced a memory for foils effect 
(and overall memory performance) on par with the familiarity group.  Further research is necessary to 
determine if these results are indeed due to extra encoding of novel lures at test time as hypothesized.  
However, it seems clear that the intent to search for novelty does not boost memory above levels found 
during typical recognition.  Instead, it is possible that a novelty orientation impairs memory by reducing 
the likelihood of using recollection or a ‘deep’ retrieval strategy. 
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5. General Conclusions 
5.1. Summary of Results 
 The hippocampus is a popular focus of research and, perhaps as a consequence, has seen its 
putative role in cognition expanded over the past decades.  What began as essentially a general memory 
module, and stood for a long time as only necessary for long-term memory, has since been claimed to be 
involved in domains including working memory, perception, language, and imagination while its role in 
memory has been scaled back to ‘only’ relational memory.  Few of these claims have gone unchallenged 
as researchers provide counter-evidence with their own patients or paradigms.  This thesis has focused on 
one of these putative domains, novelty processing.  Due primarily to the advent of neuroimaging 
techniques, the hippocampus has consistently been found to be involved in novelty processing (Knight & 
Nakada, 1998; Nyberg, 2005; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003).  However, others (Graham et al., 2010; Konkel 
& Cohen, 2009; Kumaran & Maguire, 2007) have argued that hippocampal function should be defined by 
the kinds of representations that it creates/supports or the information processing role that it provides for 
the brain (even if the authors disagree on what those representations are).  This viewpoint would dismiss 
much of the novelty literature by noting that the hippocampus would be expected to be involved in the 
examined paradigms due to its role in memory, perhaps particularly encoding relational information. 
 The data presented here aimed to address and expand the literature on novelty processing and 
how it may depend on the hippocampus.  Instead of examining expected and unexpected stimuli, or more 
and less recently studied stimuli, participants were asked to treat novelty as a goal and explicitly search 
for novelty in the environment.  A range of predictions could be made based on the novelty literature.  
Under the novelty/encoding hypothesis (Tulving & Kroll, 1995; Tulving et al., 1996), it is believed that 
novelty is a necessary component of encoding.  If a person were in a novelty orientation, actively 
searching for novel information, perhaps they would be more likely to bring encoding processes to bear 
and memory would be enhanced.  Given the central role of the hippocampus in the novelty processing 
network (Knight & Nakada, 1998) it would be expected that hippocampal lesions would reduce or 
eliminate novelty-related effects (Kishiyama et al., 2004; Knight, 1996).  Or perhaps, consistent with the 
claim made by Freed and Corkin (1988), hippocampal lesions would actually lead to a novelty preference, 
such that amnesic patients would actually perform better on memory tests that emphasize novelty. 
 However, no such effects were found.  Patients with hippocampal damage as well as matched 
comparison participants were tested on an eye tracking paradigm that has demonstrated both the 
automatic effects of memory as well as the influence of goals (Ryan et al., 2007).  Stimuli of various 
levels of memory strength (or stimulus-based novelty) were used, namely famous and non-famous faces, 
as well as unexpected (or contextually novel) stimuli, namely non-studied famous faces.  Hippocampal 
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damage had no effect on the ability to follow novelty instructions and patients treated the different levels 
of novelty in the same manner as comparison participants.  The patients did, however, demonstrate 
reduced discriminability between the studied faces and novel lures, an indication of their memory deficit. 
 The first experiment was meant to investigate multiple forms of novelty, with the manipulation of 
orientation occurring across blocks.  The second experiment expanded on the results by using much more 
novel stimuli, adding a working memory test, and manipulating orientation at the trial level instead of the 
block level.  If the hippocampus is an important part of the novelty processing network, perhaps a deficit 
would appear when that network was taxed by constantly changing demands and novel, unusual stimuli.  
However, across both behavioral and eye tracking measures, the amnesic patients performed similarly to 
the comparison participants regardless of if they were in a familiarity or a novelty orientation.  The 
patients also performed normally on the working memory trials but were impaired on the long-term 
memory trials, consistent with their memory deficit.  Indeed, the eye tracking data suggested that 
participants have a preference for familiarity even under novelty instructions, which seems problematic 
for strong accounts of novelty processing as an important function. 
 Finally, an experiment was conducted to determine what behavioral consequences might arise 
from instituting a novelty orientation.  Novel stimuli seem to enjoy the benefit of grabbing attention and 
(presumably as a consequence) greater memorability; does this benefit extend to a novelty orientation?  
The third experiment adapted the Jacoby et al. (2005) source-constraint paradigm to determine if 
participants search their memory differently when looking for novelty as opposed to familiarity.  Half of 
the participants replicated the original effects demonstrated by Jacoby et al. (2005) while following 
familiarity instructions.  The other half followed novelty instructions during the initial test phase, 
examining whether the novelty orientation has an effect on retrieval as well as encoding.  The novelty 
orientation did appear to influence retrieval as the novelty group demonstrated a reduced depth of 
processing effect.  However, it did not affect the memory for foils effect.  This null result may have been 
influenced by the fact that lures on the initial test were targets for the novelty group and as such likely 
received more attention than the familiarity group would have given them.  If this occurred, then there 
must have been a deleterious effect of the novelty orientation that was then countered by the extra 
attention.  In any event, there was no support for the idea that a novelty orientation provides any benefits 
beyond what is found under typical familiarity instructions, and there are actual costs.  
 In short, little evidence was found that a novelty process has an explanatory power beyond usual 
memory processes.  Damage to the hippocampus, known to be critical to memory, had no effect on any 
novelty manipulation attempted in the first two experiments.  This result would support the view held by 
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Habib (2001) and others that novelty and familiarity are ‘opposite sides of the same cognitive coin’.  
Novelty retrieval orientation, however, may not be simply the complement of familiarity retrieval 
orientation, as the third experiment found differences in performance between groups of young adults 
under the two different goals. 
 Some caveats must be noted in this research.  One is the constant battle of sample size fought by 
researchers using special populations.  In this case there were only four patients available (three at any 
given time) for the two amnesic patient experiments, whose performance was compared to only four 
intact control participants.  Using typical paradigms and analyses, this would be a greatly limiting 
problem.  I circumvented the issue of small sample size in two ways: by using eye tracking and by 
analyzing the data using hierarchical generalized linear regression models.  Eye tracking provides a much 
richer picture of behavioral than a single button press as well as more data in general.  While behavioral 
responses provide two pieces of data per trial (the response and the time taken to made it), eye tracking 
data are collected at 1000 Hz providing potentially thousands of data points per trial.  Even when 
summarized into fixation durations there are a number of fixations made per trial that can be analyzed in 
regards to where gaze was directed on-screen, when they occurred relative to stimulus onset, and when 
they occurred relative to when a response was made (if any was required).   
Accompanied by this larger amount of data is an analysis approach that allows for data from each 
trial to be used instead of averaged at the participant level and used for statistical inference.  The 
regression models not only allow for trial-level analysis but also improve on more typical statistical tests 
by nesting responses within the participant who made them and treating the data as coming from an 
appropriate distribution.  Behavioral responses, for example, are typically averaged at the participant level 
and expressed as a proportion correct or difference of proportions such as hit rate minus false alarm rate.  
They are then typically analyzed with t-tests or ANOVA.  Not only does this throw away a large amount 
of information (namely, what happened on each trial) but it is statistically inappropriate as proportions are 
rarely normally distributed, especially with such a small sample size.  Generalized linear models treat 
trial-level data as coming from their appropriate distribution; binary (correct or incorrect) responses are 
analyzed with a binomial regression, count data (such as transitions) with a Poisson regression, and so on.  
These regressions provide more power by using more information and treating it in a statistically 
appropriate manner. 
 Another necessary caveat is that only one patient population was tested.  That population was 
obviously critical, given that the novelty literature has focused on the hippocampus.  However, brain 
damage is known to create some general deficits, such as cognitive slowing, almost regardless of the 
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location of the lesion.  It is possible that such a general deficit could have created or contributed to the 
results found here.  However, I would argue that it is unlikely that such a deficit would have led to the 
specific results found in the first two experiments, which align nicely with decades of research on 
amnesic patients.  It is scant evidence, but one patient with a larger lesion (due to encephalitis) was tested 
in the second experiment, and his performance was similar to the two patients with restricted lesions.  
This suggests that hippocampal damage alone is sufficient to cause the results seen here.  Even so, a 
stronger argument for the specific role of the hippocampus in these results could be made if a control 
group with lesions in a different brain region were also tested in future studies.  An intriguing choice 
would be patients with lesions in the prefrontal cortex, which has also been implicated in novelty 
processing (Knight & Nakada, 1998; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003) and is known to be important for goals 
and retrieval strategies (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  However, if patients with selective enough lesions could 
be found, their memory should be largely intact.  With such a group I would predict a different pattern of 
results from what was found with the amnesic patients; memory performance would be at normal levels, 
perhaps even after a long delay, but the prefrontal patients would have difficulty instantiating a novelty 
orientation as instructed.  They would likely be more influenced by the automatic aspects of memory 
(Ryan et al., 2007) and demonstrate the retrieval orientation differences that the amnesics failed to show. 
5.2. Processing Versus Processes 
 The conclusions from the current experiments are largely based on null results; patients with 
hippocampal lesions failed to perform differently under novelty and familiarity orientations and intact 
young adults failed to show a different memory for foils effect under a novelty orientation.  In such a case 
it is important to have a strong theoretical framework for predicting these null results as well as the 
differences that were found.  I believe that the relational memory theory of hippocampal function (Cohen 
and Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001) coupled with an information processing view of 
how relational binding occurs (the Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) approach (Norman, 2010; 
Norman & O’Reilly, 2003) provide a framework that not only explains the current results but most of the 
literature in general.  The relational memory theory was described at a process level earlier; the 
hippocampus binds together items processed in regions of cortex that feed forward to it.  However, this 
provides little in the way of how exactly the hippocampus might accomplish this.   
A more mechanistic account is provided by a computational model based on the CLS approach.  
In this model, the MTL cortex (primarily perirhinal cortex) functions largely via a matching process; 
representations of previously seen items are stored in the cortex and when an item is presented it is 
compared to these representations.  These representations are largely bundles of feature values that 
describe the items already in memory or currently being presented, and any particular item would activate 
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a number of nodes in the model, representing neurons in the cortex.  The hippocampus, in contrast, stores 
representations via pattern separation due to sparse encoding.  When representations come into the 
hippocampus from the perirhinal cortex they are not only bound together (multiple perirhinal nodes 
converge onto a single hippocampal node) but they are stored in a relatively small number of nodes 
compared to the cortex (sparse encoding).  Thus inputs that share some features (thus overlapping in 
perirhinal cortex) but not others would be stored in separate hippocampal nodes (pattern separation).  This 
allows even highly similar inputs to be distinguished by the hippocampus while they would be considered 
matches by the cortex.  Furthermore, reflecting the hippocampus’ unique recurrent connections, the 
system is able to take a partial input, recover the entire input (pattern completion), and compare it to what 
is actually seen in the environment.  For example, if the system learned pairs of items A-B and C-D and 
was later presented with A-D, the cortex would likely call this an old combination due to its strong match 
to representations in memory.  The hippocampus, on the other hand, would reject A-D because of the 
non-overlapping representations of A and D in separate pairs.  Additionally, the hippocampus could 
recover the original study pair A-B using only A as an input.  The predictions of the model have been 
supported by empirical research (Duff et al., 2011; Holdstock et al., 2002) and evidence of both pattern 
separation and pattern completion have been found in the hippocampus (Bakker, Kirwan, Miller, & Stark, 
2008).  As such, the model seems well-equipped to describe how the hippocampus accomplishes 
relational binding.   
 Focusing on the type of information processing the hippocampus performs and the types of 
representations it supports allows for reasoned predictions in a variety of experimental settings (Graham 
et al., 2010; Konkel & Cohen, 2009).  The CLS model provides such a backbone.  Accounts of 
hippocampal function based on putative psychological processes, on the other hand, are less likely to be 
informative and may lead to circular reasoning (e.g. hippocampal lesions impair long-term memory, 
therefore any deficit seen in amnesic patients is due to long-term memory being involved in that task).  
Importantly, as will be described next, the relational memory/CLS model provides an account of why the 
hippocampus appears to be involved in novelty processing. 
5.3. The Hippocampus and Novelty 
 At a mechanistic level, the pattern completion portion of the CLS model relates to novelty as it 
provides the basis for a mismatch detector in the hippocampus (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; Lisman, 
1999; Lisman & Otmakhova, 2001).  The assumption is that the hippocampus is typically in ‘retrieval 
mode’.  When a stimulus is experienced, sensory cortex processes it and the representations travel to the 
hippocampus.  The hippocampus performs pattern completion, retrieving any additional information that 
might have previously been associated with that stimulus.  For example, when walking into a restaurant it 
80 
 
might retrieve the names of people seen there before.  This is a prediction, potentially calculated by 
hippocampal subregion CA3 (Lisman & Otmakhova, 2001).  Subsequent experience will also be 
processed and sent to the hippocampus, providing an opportunity for the predictions to be compared to 
reality (perhaps in CA1).  If the prediction and reality do not match, a mismatch is registered and the 
hippocampus switches to ‘encoding mode’ to create a new representation.  
As discussed throughout, the claim that the hippocampus is important for novelty processing is 
based on two types of evidence: the hippocampus is more active during the presentation of relatively 
novel/unstudied stimuli (Kirchhoff et al., 2000; Stern et al., 1996; Tulving et al., 1996) and the 
hippocampus is more active for (Yamaguchi et al., 2004), or hippocampal damage eliminates effects 
based on (Knight, 1996), unexpected stimuli.  However, both of these results are predicted by the 
relational memory theory/CLS model just described.  It is natural to expect the hippocampus to be 
important for building contextual associations and expectations; it would bind together the presence of 
certain stimuli with the experimental context or task.  This binding allows for an expectation to be created 
via pattern completion: as the experimental context continues, certain stimuli are predicted to occur.   If 
an unusual stimulus is presented, such as an oddball in the novelty oddball paradigm, the expectation is 
broken and the stimulus-experiment binding needs to be updated.  Thus the habituation found by 
Yamaguchi et al. (2004), and the absence of it in amnesic patients (Knight, 1996), is to be expected.  
After a number of similar unexpected events occur, they are no longer unexpected because the 
experimental context has been updated, or in the case of amnesics no experimental context exists to allow 
for predictions to be made and expectations to be violated.  A similar argument can be made for relatively 
novel stimuli activating the hippocampus.  To the extent that the hippocampus performs any binding on a 
stimulus, it will need to perform less binding if that stimulus occurs again (Kumaran and Maguire, 2009, 
make a similar argument).  Assuming that mismatch detection drives the observed hippocampal 
responses, is it necessary to claim that the hippocampus additionally supports novelty processing? 
The current work aimed to avoid these issues and the conflation of novelty effects with relational 
processing by examining novelty as a goal or retrieval orientation instead of as a stimulus property.  A 
strong conclusion given the current empirical results as well as literature review would be that ‘novelty 
processing’ does not exist and instead familiarity and novelty are complements as claimed by Habib 
(2001).  This may be true in regard to stimulus novelty, as discussed throughout.  However, this may not 
be the case when applied to meta-mnemonic processes like retrieval strategy.  While novelty effects do 
not appear to depend on the hippocampus, the third experiment did find evidence that behavior changes 
under a novelty orientation as compared to a familiarity orientation.  The intention to find novel stimuli 
appears to reduce source-constrained retrieval, being sufficient to reduce the commonly found depth of 
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processing effect.  Further research is necessary to validate the claim that a novelty orientation makes 
controlled retrieval and reinstatement of study processes less likely.  Further arguments could then be 
made as to whether novelty processing exists as a kind of retrieval orientation or whether it is then simply 
a particular constellation of strategies; that is to say, the same effects could be brought about by the same 
underlying retrieval strategies via some other manipulation.  However, that is beyond the scope of the 
current work.  What has been shown here is that novelty processing may exist as a phenomenon, but not 
in the manner typically described in the literature, and it does not rely on the hippocampus. 
5.4. Conclusion 
 Across three experiments novelty processing was tested as a goal or retrieval orientation.  The 
first two experiments demonstrated that certain mnemonic processes, but not the ability to instantiate a 
novelty orientation, are dependent on the hippocampus despite its prominent role in the novelty literature.  
A third experiment demonstrated that a novelty orientation is not simply the complement of a familiarity 
orientation but that it does have its own effects on performance.  The former results combined with other 
evidence from the literature suggest that many novelty-based results can be accounted for with existing 
mnemonic functions without requiring an additional novelty process.  The latter result, in contrast, is a 
novel demonstration of a potential novelty-based retrieval strategy or process.  Further research will be 
needed to better describe both the representations and the neural bases involved in the novelty and 
familiarity retrieval goals examined here. 
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